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Executive Summary
Growing inequality
Over the past 30 years all indicators capturing income  
and wealth inequality deteriorated in Germany. Income 
inequality was relatively low before 1990, and even 
declined over much of the 20th century, but it changed 
direction after German unification. Over the past decades, 
the rise in wage inequality was faster in Germany than  
in the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada.
Not too much, but too little innovation
One explanation for rising inequality has been ‘too  
rapid’ and ‘pervasive’ technological innovation, replacing 
human labor and generating higher wages for certain  
high-skilled workers alone. With increased digital inno- 
vation and automatization over recent decades, policy- 
makers feared severe job losses and forecasts suggested 
that even more jobs could be lost due to future techno-
logical progress (Frey and Osborne, 2015). There is, how-
ever, little evidence so far that this is occurring. Instead, 
this study shows that inequality in Germany started to 
increase in the 1990s due to the opposite effect – the 
country’s declining achievements in technological inno-
vation. 
The real problem: Innovation and declining labor  
productivity growth
Germany spends more than EUR 80 billion on research 
and development (R&D) each year. Almost 400,000 scien-
tists work in R&D. This study finds that all these efforts 
are not leading to stronger labor productivity growth. 
Instead, it has been consistently declining, even in the 
face of increased spending on innovation; it was five times 
slower in 2013 than in 1992. This decline is inconsistent  
with a scenario of technological innovation replacing  
human labor: if large-scale replacement of human labor 
occurred, one should normally see a massive boost to 
labor productivity for those workers who still remain 
in the workforce. A recent study in Germany also con-
cludes that robots have not destroyed jobs in Germany, 
but working in environments with robots brings a higher 
chance of remaining employed (Dauth et al., 2017b).
Real labor compensation is crucial for inclusive growth
As labor productivity stagnated, and the country’s inter-
national competitiveness weakened, government and 
businesses started to reduce real labor compensation from 
the mid-1990s. As a result, various welfare benefits were 
also reduced or abolished. Self-employment and forms of 
irregular and part-time employment with low(er) wages 
increased, while union density rates dropped. The level of 
working- and ‘at-risk-of-poverty’ doubled between 2005 
and 2015.
Several industries have also lowered their relative labor 
costs by outsourcing and offshoring production, which put 
pressure on wages in Germany. As technological innova-
tions are often embedded in the capital stock, the decline 
in net fixed capital investment not only led to reduced 
levels of investments in innovation by firms, but also 
contributed to a sluggish diffusion of technological inno-
vations throughout the economy. The net result was that 
profits grew faster than labor wages, leading to a decline 
in the relative share of labor in national income, with top 
incomes rising out of all proportion (Piketty, 2013).
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Firms and management also matter for innovation  
and inclusive growth
This rise in inequality was exacerbated by two features 
related to the private sector: first, good management 
skills relevant for innovation were in relative short sup-
ply, leading to a rise in CEO wages. Second, this lack of 
management skills resulted in an increasing divergence  
of company-level productivity growth, generating, in 
turn, high productivity frontier firms vs. low productiv-
ity laggard firms. The same skills absence further contrib-
uted to a more sluggish diffusion of technological inno-
vation throughout the economy, making innovation less 
effective. 
Falling behind in cutting-edge technologies
While Germany is highly competent in traditional and 
medium-technology industries, such as automobiles and 
machine tools, it has failed to acquire the innovation lead 
in semiconductors, computing, 3D-printing, nanotech-
nology, robotics or molecular biology – the drivers of 
what has been named the ‘fourth industrial revolution’ 
or Industry 4.0 by the World Economic Forum. Only four 
German firms are among the top 30 innovative companies 
in the areas of 3D-printing, nanotechnology, and robot-
ics (as measured in terms of patent numbers). The top 20 
patent applicants in nanotechnology have not included a 
single German firm since 1970. Here, German firms are 
lagging behind those from the United States, Japan, South 
Korea, and increasingly also China. In addition, innovative 
industries such as photo-voltaics (PV) have increasingly 
moved abroad: in 2013 alone, almost half of the roughly 
100,000 workers in Solar PV manufacturing in Germany 
lost their jobs. 
Policy implications
This study shows that Germany needs innovation that 
increases labor productivity. For this to occur, it is clear 
that a fundamental change is required in the national 
innovation system. The country has a tradition of estab- 
lishing a unique and effective collaboration between 
industries, government and higher education institutions,  
also called the ‘triple-helix’ system, which has been much 
lauded for its strongly specialized system of vocational 
and scientific training. However, the high degree of  
specialization may have led to rather incremental inno-
vation in recent decades – with little effect on inclusive 
growth. This study thus calls for increased diversity in  
the German education system, allowing for lifelong learn-
ing and a higher degree of workforce adaptability to new 
working environments. Moreover, this study also finds 
that Germany requires a new industrial innovation policy 
that focuses on high quality innovation and not solely  
on protecting incumbent sectors and firms. In addition,  
Germany needs a venture capital strategy, allowing new 
high-tech firms to thrive that can eventually produce 
decisive innovations and, consequently, more inclusive 
growth.
All these policies aimed to achieve sustained and inclu-
sive growth in Germany will pay off in the long run. In 
the meantime, the social welfare state is key to keeping 
growth inclusive. This study suggests that Germany could 
opt for innovative measures and schemes the strengthen 
the idea of the progressive taxation and reduce inequality.  
Options to achieve this goal are to improve benefits for 
low income households and to improve market contesta-
bility as well as to set incentives for companies to invest 
and raise wages for all workers. 
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Arbeitsproduktivität führen. Jenes Wachstum hat in den 
letzten Jahren sukzessive abgenommen, trotz der hohen 
Ausgaben für Forschung und Entwicklung. Die Arbeits-
produktivität wuchs im Jahr 2013 etwa fünf Mal langsamer 
als im Jahr 1992. Dieser Umstand spricht gegen die Vor-
stellung, dass der technologische Wandel menschliche  
Arbeitskraft ersetzt: in diesem Fall würde die Arbeitspro-
duktivität derjenigen, die weiterhin im Arbeitsmarkt ver-
bleiben, stark ansteigen. Untersuchungen zeigen etwa, 
dass der zunehmende Einsatz von Robotern in der deut-
schen Arbeitswelt nicht zu weniger Arbeitsplätzen geführt 
hat. Das Gegenteil ist offenbar der Fall: Arbeitsplätze, 
in deren Umfeld Roboter zum Einsatz kommen, seien 
zukunftssicherer (Dauth et al., 2017b). 
Reallohnverluste gefährden inklusives Wachstum
Das sinkende Wachstum der Arbeitsproduktivität setzt 
die Wettbewerbsfähigkeit der deutschen Wirtschaft unter 
Druck. Infolgedessen sanken die Reallöhne seit Mitte der 
1990er Jahre. Zusätzlich wurden die Leistungen des Sozial- 
staats teilweise reduziert, der Niedriglohnsektor nahm an 
Bedeutung zu und Gewerkschaften gerieten unter Druck. 
Der Anteil der von Armut betroffenen Menschen, die in 
Arbeit sind, verdoppelte sich zwischen den Jahren 2005 
und 2015. Gleichzeitig verlagerten zahlreiche deutsche 
Unternehmen Teile ihrer Produktion in das Ausland, was 
den Lohndruck verschärfte. Hinzu kommt, dass deutsche 
Firmen bei Zukunftsinvestitionen zurückhaltend waren, 
sodass tiefgreifende Innovationen weniger stark gefördert 
wurden. Die Folge: zahlreiche technische Innovationen 
durchdrangen nicht alle Teile der deutschen Wirtschaft. 
All diese Faktoren sorgten außerdem dafür, dass Profite 
schneller wuchsen als Lohneinkommen und die Ungleich-
heit zunahm (Piketty, 2013).
Zusammenfassung
Zunehmende Ungleichheit
In den letzten 30 Jahren wiesen Indikatoren für wirt-
schaftliche Entwicklung eine zunehmende Ungleichheit  
bei Löhnen und Vermögen in Deutschland auf. War jene 
Ungleichheit vor den 1990er Jahren noch gering und nahm 
zuvor im Laufe des 20. Jahrhundert sukzessive ab, so 
wuchs sie seit der Wiedervereinigung stärker als etwa in 
den USA, Großbritannien und Kanada.
Nicht zu viel, sondern zu wenig Innovation
Eine oftmals angeführte Erklärung für diese Entwick-
lung ist die angeblich zu schnelle und zunehmend wich-
tiger werdende technologische Innovation: diese ersetze 
menschliche Arbeitskraft durch Roboter und lediglich 
hochausgebildete Spezialisten würden Lohnsteigerungen  
erfahren. Aufgrund der zunehmenden Digitalisierung und 
Automatisierung fürchten viele daher einen massiven  
Arbeitsplatzabbau, der mit abermals wachsender Ungleich- 
heit einhergeht. Einige Studien gehen gar davon aus,  
dass jeder zweite Arbeitsplatz gefährdet sein könnte (Frey 
und Osborne, 2015). Bisher gibt es jedoch kaum Anzeichen 
für diese Entwicklung. Diese Studie zeigt, dass die seit 
den 1990er Jahren wachsende Ungleichheit vielmehr ein 
Ergebnis einer gegenteiligen Entwicklung ist – des zu  
geringen Erfolgs von technologischen Innovationen in 
Deutschland. 
Die Steigerung der Arbeitsproduktivität ist die zentrale 
Herausforderung
Deutschland investiert mit jährlich mehr als 80 Milliar-
den Euro eine beträchtliche Summe für Forschung und 
Entwicklung – ein Bereich, in dem schon heute mehr als 
400.000 Menschen in Deutschland beschäftigt sind. Das 
zentrale Problem liegt laut dieser Studie darin, dass diese 
Anstrengungen nicht zu einem stärkeren Wachstum der 
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Auch Unternehmen und Management sind von Bedeutung
Die wachsende Ungleichheit wurde laut dieser Studie  
aufgrund von zwei weiteren Entwicklungen in der deut-
schen Wirtschaft verschärft: Zum einen sind die Anforde-
rungen an das Topmanagement und die Nachfrage nach 
Managementfähigkeiten für Innovations- und Zukunfts-
fähigkeit gestiegen und die Spitzengehälter daher stark 
gewachsen. Zum anderen sind diese Managementfähig-
keiten ein entscheidender Erfolgsfaktor für Innovations- 
kraft. Da nicht alle Firmen über das entsprechende Mana- 
gement-Know-How verfügen, kommt es zu einer Spal-
tung in Firmen mit hohem und solchen mit niedrigem 
Produktivitätswachstum. Zugleich kommt der technologi-
sche Fortschritt nicht in der Breite bei allen Unternehmen 
und in allen Branchen an, sodass die Innovationsfähigkeit 
gesamtwirtschaftlich abnimmt. 
Deutschland fällt bei Spitzentechnologien zurück
Deutschlands Stärken liegen vor allem in der Industrie,  
etwa im Maschinenbau oder im Automobilsektor. Deutsch-
land ist hingegen nicht an der Spitze der heute so innova- 
tionsstarken Branchen wie beispielsweise der Halbleiter- 
technologie, Computern, 3D-Druck, Nanotechnologie, 
Robotik oder der molekularen Biologie – all diese Bereiche 
treiben die vom Weltwirtschafsforum benannte „Vierte 
Industrielle Revolution“. Gemessen an den Patentzahlen 
sind lediglich vier deutsche Firmen unter den Top 30 der 
innovativsten Unternehmen im Bereich des 3D-Drucks, 
der Nanotechnologie und der Roboterindustrie. Unter den 
Top 20 der Patentbewerber seit 1970 ist keine deutsche 
Firma. Deutsche Unternehmen fielen in den genannten 
Industrien hinter Ländern wie die USA, Japan, Südkorea 
und China zurück. Gleichzeitig verlagerten innovations-
starke Zukunftsfelder wie die Photovoltaik-Industrie (PV) 
ihre Aktivitäten ins Ausland: Allein im Jahr 2013 verlor 
fast die Hälfte der rund 100.000 Beschäftigten in der deut-
schen PV-Industrie ihre Arbeit. 
Handlungsempfehlungen
Die vorliegende Studie zeigt, dass die deutsche Wirt-
schaft mehr tiefgreifende Innovationen benötigt, die auf 
die Steigerung der Arbeitsproduktivität abstellen. Dafür 
bedarf es eines fundamentalen Wandels der Innovations-
bemühungen. Deutschland konnte traditionell auf eine 
effektive Kooperation aus eng verzahnten Branchen, dem 
Staat und den Hochschulen als sogenannte „Triple Helix“ 
bauen, die mit einem stark spezialisierten Ausbildungs-
system einen wichtigen Beitrag zum Wirtschaftswachs-
tum leistete. Diese Spezialisierung hat laut dieser Studie 
in den letzten Jahrzehnten eher zu Prozessinnovationen 
geführt – diese wiederum tragen aufgrund ihres weniger 
starken Effekts auf die Arbeitsproduktivität nur bedingt 
zu inklusivem Wachstum bei. Ein stärker generalistischer 
Ansatz im Ausbildungssystem kann lebenslanges Lernen 
erleichtern und so Arbeitnehmer für die sich durch tief-
greifende Innovationen ständig wandelnde Arbeitswelt 
rüsten. Viele Initiativen heutiger Industrie- und Innovati-
onspolitik zielen vor allem darauf ab, etablierte Branchen 
zu fördern und die starken Branchen in Deutschland zu 
schützen. Dieser Ansatz führt laut dieser Studie zu einer 
Innovation „der kleinen Schritte“ und stärkt weniger jene 
Bereiche, in denen Deutschland Potenzial zum Aufholen 
hat. Deutschland braucht daher einen neuen Ansatz in der 
Industrie- und Innovationspolitik, der spezifisch auf tief-
greifende Innovationen abstellt. 
Diese Maßnahmen werden mittel- und langfristig grei- 
fen und können nachhaltiges und inklusives Wachstum  
ermöglichen. In der kurzen Frist kann der Sozialstaat 
einen Beitrag zu inklusivem Wachstum leisten. Konkrete 
Möglichkeiten liegen etwa darin, Leistungen für Haus-
halte mit geringen Einkommen zu erhöhen und gleichzei-
tig den Wettbewerb so zu verbessern, dass Unternehmen 
verstärkt investieren und Löhne erhöhen. 
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1 Introduction
causes. It was precisely because technological innovation 
had become less and less effective at raising labor produc-
tivity in Germany that policy makers and the corporate  
sector turned to measures to curb labor compensation so  
as to improve international competitiveness.
This study shows that technological innovation has histor-
ically been a driving force for inclusive economic growth in 
Germany, and identifies three reasons why this is no longer 
the case. These are (i) historic legacies, (ii) weaknesses in 
the education system, and (iii) entrepreneurial stagnation. 
Improving the impact of technological innovations on labor 
productivity growth will require a more diversified educa-
tion system, a deepening of active labor market policies, 
better immigration policies, and more competitive markets. 
Ensuring these recommendations are enacted in a coordi-
nated fashion points to the need for an appropriate indus-
trial innovation policy.
The call in this study for more and better technological  
innovation and the message that it is a driver of inclusive  
growth is somewhat contrary to some of the recent litera-
ture and the popular press (see e. g., Ford, 2015). These tend 
to blame too rapid technological innovation for income  
inequality and jobless growth, warning that technological  
innovation is skill-biased, disproportionately driving up  
the wages of the highly skilled workforce, and eliminating  
middle-skill intensive jobs, causing wage polarization 
(Brynjolfsson and McAfee, 2012). Frey and Osborne (2015) 
predict that up to 51 percent of current jobs in Germany 
may be lost due to technological innovation (e. g., auto-
mation) in the future, and Acemoglu and Restrepo (2017) 
warn, based on U.S. data, that each new robot can replace 
up to seven jobs. The present study does not share this  
pessimism and moreover supports the conclusion of stud-
ies such as those by Autor (2015) and Pfeiffer (2016), that 
the prediction of robots taking over human jobs is unlikely 
to materialize. In particular, Dauth et al. (2017b, p. 39) find 
that in Germany ‘more robot exposed workers are even 
more likely to remain employed in their original work-
Economic growth in Germany is no longer as inclusive as it 
used to be. Between 1990 and 2010 all measures of income 
and wealth inequality rose considerably,1 which even led the 
media to portray Germany as a ‘divided nation’.2 Income 
inequality was relatively low before 1990, and even declined 
over much of the 20th century, but changed direction after 
German unification.
The rise in income inequality from 1990 onwards is 
depicted in Figure 1 through various inequality indica-
tors and the ‘at-risk-of-poverty rate’. It can be seen that 
all measures of income inequality (before and after tax) 
increased markedly after 1990 along with the ‘at-risk-of-
poverty rate’.3 Felbermayr et al. (2014) furthermore docu-
ment that the rise in wage inequality was faster in Germany 
than in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Can-
ada between the mid-1990s and 2010. This rise in income 
and wage inequality has been accompanied, and to a certain 
extent occasioned, by a simultaneous increase in wealth 
inequality. Using data from the Socio-Economic Panel 
(SOEP), Frick and Grabka (2009) show, that the Gini coef-
ficient for wealth increased from 0.77 to 0.80 during this 
period, and wealth grew particularly strongly at the top 1 
percent of the wealth distribution.
A growing number of studies have investigated the rea-
sons for this rise in income and wealth inequality (see for 
instance Dustmann et al., 2009, 2014; Biewen and Juhasz, 
2012; Felbermayr et al., 2014). The present study contrib-
utes to this literature by arguing that a decline in the effec-
tiveness of technological innovation, together with the  
erosion of the social welfare state, have been important 
1 High inequality negatively affects growth and sustainable economic 
development (Berg and Ostry, 2011; Ostry et al., 2014) and may lead  
to economic, political and social turmoil (Stiglitz, 2012).
2 Der Spiegel, 12.03.2016: ‘Die geteilte Nation’.
3 Somaskanda (2015) reports, citing the Paritätischer Gesamtverband,  
that Germany is at its highest poverty levels since reunification 
with 12.5 million poor people, of which 3 million are estimated to be 
‘working poor’. This leads to the observation, or concern, that ‘rich 
Germany has a poverty problem’.
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nological innovation is an important factor for understand-
ing rising income inequality. In Section 7 the main findings 
are summarized and various recommendations for policy 
and further research discussed.
place’, even though there are more robots per worker in 
Germany than in the US or any other European country.
The rest of this study is structured as follows. In Section 2 
the core message is outlined and diagrammatically illus-
trated, with cross-references to the various sections, where 
the details of the specific arguments are elaborated. Sec-
tion 3 shows that technological innovation has historically 
been a driving force for inclusive growth in Germany, and 
Section 4 documents that the effectiveness of technological 
innovation has declined in recent years. In Section 5 three 
broad reasons are discussed why technological innovation, 
despite high and rising expenditure on boosting innovation, 
is not stimulating labor productivity growth: (i) historical 
legacies, (ii) weaknesses in the education system, and (iii) 
entrepreneurial stagnation. In Section 6 evidence is pro-
vided to show that the decline in the effectiveness of tech-
FIGURE 1: Inequality measures and poverty rate, 1991 to 2015
Notes: At-risk-of-poverty rate is defined as ‘[p]ersons with less than 60 percent of median disposable income’.  
Gini coefficient on scale between 0 (low inequality) and 1 (high inequality). Real incomes in prices of 2010.  
Population: Persons living in private households. Equivalized annual income surveyed the following year. Equivalized with the modified OECD-scale (Grabka and Goebel, 2017, p. 55). 
Market Income = Labor income, capital income, private transfers, imputed rent (fictive income advantages from owner-occupied housing).  
Disposable income = Further contains benefits from social security, social transfers, direct taxes, social security contributions, obligatory health insurance.
Data source: Figures taken from Grabka and Goebel (2017), based on data from SOEPv32 (calculations of DIW Berlin),
Federal Statistics Office (Microcensus, EU-SILC).   
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2 Linking technological innovation  
and inclusive economic growth
The second and the central question addressed here is: how 
can the link between technological innovation and inequal-
ity be characterized in Germany?
There are increasing concerns that too rapid technological 
innovation is responsible for rising inequality. This study 
argues that this is not the case in Germany – rather, it is 
the lack of effective technological innovation that triggers 
responses by government and the corporate sector, contrib-
uting to rising inequality, on top of demographic pressures. 
The argument can be explained with the help of Figure 2.
Technological innovation drives labor productivity growth 
[Box 1 to Box 2], which is a fundamental aspect of endoge-
nous growth theory. The extent of labor productivity growth, 
in turn, determines the economy’s competitiveness [Box 3], 
as well as the real compensation of labor, and how it is dis-
tributed [Box 8]. Germany’s key challenge lies in declining 
labor productivity growth. This study documents that this 
decline has been consistent, even in the face of an increased 
spend on innovation. Labor productivity growth was five 
times slower in 2013 than in 1992. This decline is inconsist- 
ent with a scenario of rapid technological innovation, or 
with technology replacing human labor. As Yglesias (2015) 
and Dauth et al. (2017b) point out automatization and dig-
italization do not appear to lead to massive job losses. In 
Germany, declining labor productivity growth was exacer-
bated by the negative productivity shock from unification.
The problem caused by this decline is that real compen-
sation of labor will, over the long run, only grow in line 
with labor productivity growth. In Germany real wage 
growth has indeed been sluggish and declining, and was 
even around zero and negative during the mid-2000s when 
stagnation in labor productivity growth set in. This slower 
wages growth implies that domestic demand will also grow 
slowly [Box 10].
A comprehensive literature studies the impact of labor pro-
ductivity growth on wage distribution, accounting for ris-
For purposes of this study, growth is inclusive ‘if and only 
if the incomes of poor people grow faster than those of the 
population as a whole, that is, inequality declines’ (Anand 
et al., 2013, p. 1). The first question to answer in this section 
is therefore: how is inequality defined?
Inequality is a complex term that implies a set of theoreti-
cal constructs, and there exist various ways to measure and 
express this concept empirically. While inequality is often 
associated with material or economic aspects, such as ine-
quality in wages, incomes or wealth, it goes far beyond this. 
The concept must be extended to comprise non-material 
aspects such as equal access to opportunities, for example 
in education and employment, and the prospect of social 
mobility.
Here, however, to provide a tractable analysis given the lack 
of sufficient and consistent data on non-material equality  
in Germany, we will define and measure inequality by the 
distribution of incomes (wage and capital incomes) and 
wealth. As indicated in the introduction, all such measures  
have deteriorated in Germany over the past thirty years. 
Primarily, this study focuses on income inequality, meas- 
ured by changes in the distribution of wage and rental 
(capital) incomes over time.
If inequality increases within a society, or remains at  
persistently high levels over time, it may have negative 
economic and social consequences that merit counter-
vailing measures. Inequality may lead to a set of negative 
externalities that cause economic, political and social tur-
moil (Stiglitz, 2012). In contrast, nations with a more equal 
society are more likely to grow and develop economically4 
(Birdsall and Londoño, 1997).
4 While too much inequality is highly problematic, some inequality  
is also unavoidable, and even desirable. Some level of inequality is 
considered necessary to provide incentives, and stimulate develop-
ment. Forced complete equality can threaten personal freedom.  
Additionally, institutions suffer from efficiency losses due to a  
‘leaky bucket’ of bureaucracy or administration in the distribution 
process (Keeley, 2014).
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ing wage inequality as the outcome of skill-biased techno-
logical change (SBTC) (see e. g., Acemoglu and Autor, 2011). 
Goldin and Katz (2010) explain that the wage premium of 
workers with the skills to use the new technology continues 
to rise if their supply fails to keep up with demand, due to 
the speed of innovation and technology diffusion. A more 
unequal distribution of incomes will result in an overall 
decline in domestic demand growth [Box 10]. While there 
is some evidence of a rising wage premium due to SBTC in 
Germany, this study concludes that it has been insignificant 
for income inequality, and has not been the major threat  
to jobs and incomes. To be more specific, there is little  
evidence that technology is generally replacing human 
workers with machines and robots, and especially not at 
the high skilled level (Marin, 2014; Dauth et al., 2017b).
A decline in labor productivity will put the competitiveness 
of the economy [Box 3] under pressure, and will cause the 
corporate sector (the entrepreneurial system) to respond 
by, for instance, offshoring production to locations with 
lower wages or higher productivity5 and, furthermore, by 
increasing corporate savings, thereby investing less in fixed 
5 The offshoring of production refers to the allocation of parts of the 
supply chain, within the production process, to other countries.
capital. This study presents evidence that this has occurred 
in Germany in recent years. Today large corporations hold 
substantial amounts of cash, equivalent to 20 percent of 
the country’s GDP, instead of investing in capital or break-
through innovations. The significant decline in corporate  
fixed capital investment, in turn, further decreases the 
effectiveness of technological innovation, because it delays 
the distribution and spread of technology throughout the 
economy, given that new technology is most often embod-
ied in the capital that laborers use. The net result has been 
that profits grew faster than labor wages, leading to a 
decline in the relative share of labor in national incomes, 
with top incomes also rising out of proportion, as Piketty 
(2013) explains.
The extent to which the corporate sector engages in the 
above-mentioned adjustments towards better competitive-
ness will partly depend on the success of the educational 
system to deliver workers with those skills in demand, and 
ones that can ‘travel’ between different sectors. If the edu-
cation system is too specialized and does not deliver the 
right kind of skills, the wage gap will grow faster via SBTC, 
but also via rising forms of insecure and low-wage employ-
ment. As a consequence, growth will be less inclusive and 
domestic demand will grow slower.
FIGURE 2: The channels from innovation to inclusiveness
Source: Authors’ own creation. 
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Labor productivity growth
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Fears of reduced competitiveness not only elicit a response 
from the corporate sector, but also from government. 
Fearing that the country’s international competitiveness 
would be weakened, government also contributed towards 
the reduction of real labor compensation from the mid-
1990s. The so-called Hartz reforms were the central policy 
response in this regard. As a result various benefits of the 
social welfare state were reduced or abolished. Self-em-
ployment and forms of irregular and part-time employ-
ment on low(er) wages increased, while labor unionization 
rates fell. The rate of working- and ‘at-risk-of-poverty’ 
doubled from 4.8 percent to 9.6 percent between 2005 and 
2015. Thus, although unemployment fell after peaking in 
2005, income inequality did not (Biewen and Juhasz, 2012). 
The authors ascribe this outcome, at least partially, to the 
fact that the rise in employment was largely due to more 
self-employment together with part-time working and 
marginal forms of employment.
At the same time as the above pressures on real labor com-
pensation, certain skills became scarcer due to demographic 
changes and the nature of the education system. The rel-
atively specialized nature of higher education in Germany 
hampered the mobility of skills between sectors. More 
elderly workers and pensioners may accentuate reduced 
productivity, which reduces consumption growth and leads 
to an upward pressure on the wage premium. The overall 
effect leads to reduced domestic demand growth [Box 10], 
and greater inequality in incomes and wealth (i. e., reduced 
inclusiveness of growth).
Whereas the stagnation in domestic demand could have  
led to policy responses to stimulate demand, such as 
expanding government consumption and investment, and 
encouraging fixed investment by corporations, Germany 
ignored these owing to the benefits of the euro exchange 
rate, which favors the country’s exports. The euro, it has 
been argued, induces the ‘hyper-competitiveness’ of the 
German economy, as evidenced by the fact it has the largest 
current account surplus worldwide. Hence, corporates  
and government could partly ignore the decline in domestic 
consumption. The ability to shift production to meet for-
eign demand through exporting and move to offshore pro-
duction resulted in German firms reducing their demand 
for low-skilled labor while increasing their demand for 
high-skilled labor, driving the wage premium upward 
(Becker and Muendler, 2015). In this regard, Felbermayr  
et al. (2014) document that by 2003 exporting firms in  
Germany paid what can be labeled an ‘exporter premium’,  
resulting in wages 11 percent higher on average. The 
authors also find that the export premium has become a 
significant contributor towards wage inequality only  
since 2003, ascribing this to an indirect effect of the Hartz 
labor market reforms and the decentralization of collective 
bargaining in the late 1990s and stating that ‘wage flex-
ibility has increased sharply in Germany due to the doc-
umented decline of collective bargaining agreements. As 
such, company characteristics […] such as export status 
have a stronger effect on paid wages’ (Felbermayr et al., 
2014, p. 37).
This rise in income inequality was exacerbated by two  
features related to a poor innovation performance: (i) good 
management skills were in relative short supply, leading to 
a rise in CEO wages; (ii) the scarcity of management skills 
resulted in an increasing divergence in firm-level produc-
tivity growth, which, in turn, produced high productivity 
frontier firms vs. low productivity laggard firms. A lack of 
management skills further contributed to a more sluggish 
diffusion of technological innovation across the economy, 
making innovation less effective.
The conclusion of this study is that Germany needs more 
and better innovation that will reboot labor productivity.  
While it is highly competent in traditional and medium- 
technology industries, such as automobiles and machine 
tools, it has failed to acquire the innovation lead in semi- 
conductors, computing, 3D-printing, nanotechnology, 
robotics or molecular biology – the drivers of what has 
been named the ‘fourth industrial revolution’ by the World  
Economic Forum. Only four German firms are among the 
top 30 innovative companies in the areas of 3D-printing,  
nanotechnology, and robotics (as measured in terms of 
patents). The top 20 patent applicants in nanotechnology  
have not included a single German firm since 1970. In all  
of these fields, German firms are lagging behind those from 
the United States, Japan, South Korea, and increasingly 
also China. Germany has been, until recently, a technology 
leader in solar photo-voltaic (PV) energy. By now, however, 
most of the solar PV production has ‘moved out of Germany’ 
to China: almost 50 percent of the 100, 300 workers in Solar 
PV manufacturing in Germany lost their jobs in just one 
year (2013). Because these new technologies now funda-
mentally affect manufacturing, Germany’s critically impor-
tant manufacturing sector is facing the threat of ending  
up as ‘a sub-sector of the IT sector in the US’.
To boost innovation in Germany, this study argues, a  
fundamental change is required in the national innovation  
system. In Section 3 we describe how Germany has tradi- 
tionally established an excellent system of innovation:  
between 1850 and 1913, when Germany experienced its 
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remarkable industrialization, the unique collaboration  
between industries, government and higher education  
institutions created the ‘triple-helix’ system, which 
remained largely intact after the Second World War. The 
system’s earlier success, however, may be starting to work 
against delivering the type of effective innovation that is 
now required. An appropriate industrial innovation policy, 
supported by diversification of the higher education sector, 
is necessary instead. Such an industrial innovation policy 
will require a change in the approach and organization of 
the public sector in this regard, raising the question posed 
by Mazzucato (2015, p. 125): ‘[h]ow should public organ-
izations be structured so that they can accommodate the 
risk-taking and explorative capacity needed?’
This study does not answer this question, although an 
answer will eventually have to be delivered if sustained and 
inclusive growth in Germany is to resume in future. In the 
meantime, the social welfare state is central (see diagram 
[Box 11]). In particular, compensatory social welfare poli-
cies, including redistributive taxes and transfers and active 
labor market measures, remain the first line of defense 
against rising income and wealth inequalities and dealing 
with the challenges thrown up by changing demographics.
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3 Technological innovation and inclusive 
growth in Germany: A tale of two periods
coincided with the ‘first era of globalization’ (Twarog, 
1997) and the ‘second industrial revolution’. In fact, the 
innovation system supported and drove rapid industri-
alization, with Germany specializing in fields that were 
characteristic for the ‘second industrial revolution’, such 
as chemicals, automobiles and electricity. This develop-
ment was accompanied by inclusive growth as shown by 
the Human Development Index (HDI) which rose from 48.3 
(in the period 1871 to 1880) to 68.6 in 1912 (see Figure 3). 
As Twarog (1997) summarizes, real per capita income grew 
by 15 percent per decade between 1850 and 1913, industrial 
production achieved a growth rate of 37 percent per decade, 
and the population living in cities of more than 100,000 
people increased from 4.8 percent in 1871 to 21.3 percent in 
1910. In just about half a century the Germany economy had 
been significantly transformed. During this time, however, 
income inequality did not worsen (Williamson, 1995).
Innovation played an important role in driving this inclu-
sive growth. A large growth component over this period 
was that in total factor productivity (TFP), a frequently 
used indirect indicator of technological progress. Bur-
hop and Wolff (2005, p. 640) find that TFP contributed 63.9 
percent to total net national product (NNP) growth between 
1851 and 1913. Without the myriad of (radical) technologi-
cal innovations that the system produced during this period 
(see Table 1), German industrialization and economic 
development would not have been as successful.
What made these radical technological innovations  
possible? This is a pertinent question, as by all accounts 
Germany was still an ‘industrial backwater’ around 1850. 
Bairoch (1982, p. 284) documents that Germany was still 
lagging behind the United Kingdom, the United States, 
China, India, France, and Russia in terms of manufacturing 
output up to and including 1860. A century later, however, 
Germany had not only caught-up and transformed, but had 
also become the world’s leading innovator. Most economic 
historians agree that Germany’s performance was powered  
by the rise of its education and scientific sectors, and in 
In this section Germany’s experiences over the period 1850 
to 1913 are compared with the post-World War II period 
(1950 to present). This is useful for a number of reasons: 
first, the relationship between technology, growth, and 
social outcomes tends to be persistent and institutions can 
have long-term effects – outcomes therefore often have 
historic roots. Second, it allows one to evaluate the impact 
of the national innovation system and to identify structural 
breaks. Third, a historical perspective makes strikingly 
clear that innovation-driven growth has been inclusive over 
a long span of time.
The historical overview underlines two points: first, tech- 
nological innovation has historically been an important 
source of inclusive growth in Germany, based on a series  
of remarkable breakthrough product innovations in the late 
19th and early 20th centuries that laid the foundations for 
virtually the entire modern German economy. During this 
period the German social welfare state, the world’s first, 
was established. And second, in the period after the Second 
World War, technological innovation became less effective, 
focusing on incremental process innovations, accompanied 
by an increase in inequality over the past two decades. In the 
remainder of this section the key features of these periods  
in terms of innovation-inequality linkages are discussed.
3.1  The period of rapid innovation and 
inclusive growth: 1850 to 1913
Germany’s system of technological innovation came into 
being between 1850 and 1913. This was the period of Ger-
many’s industrialization (Beise and Stahl, 1999),6 and 
6 Although Germany’s industrial revolution started around 1850,  
various types of manufacturing activities and ‘pre-industrialization’ 
pockets can be found before this time. As Ogilvie (1996) points out, 
the regions around Nuremberg were containing fairly advanced man-
ufacturing hubs for the time, and parts of the Rhineland and Saxony 
were industrializing on small-scale by 1780.
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particular by the collaboration among educational and 
research institutions, private entrepreneurs and govern-
ment.
In the subsequent discussion our study focuses respec-
tively on (i) the education and science establishment; (ii) 
the entrepreneurs and the business community; and (iii) 
the government, describing how their collaboration created 
the so-called ‘triple-helix’ model of innovation and devel-
opment (Mroczkowski, 2014).
As far as the education and scientific research establish-
ment is concerned, Watson (2010) traces significant insti-
tutional contributions to Frederick the Great’s establish-
ment of the Berlin Academy of Arts and Science in the 18th 
century, as well as to a ‘revolution’ in learning and read-
ing. As the author documents, by the year 1800 around 
270 reading societies existed in Germany, with literacy 
rates in Prussia and Saxony amounting to the highest in 
the world.7 In subsequent decades, between 1790 and 1840, 
German scholars, such as Wilhelm von Humboldt, re-cre-
7 By 1800, Germany’s adult literacy rate was 35 percent and it was  
publishing 116 million printed books per year, only lagging behind 
France and the United Kingdom (Buringh and van Zanden, 2009).
ated German universities as research institutions – her-
alding the modern research university – that differed from 
earlier universities in their focus on new knowledge gener-
ation and innovation. This has been called the ‘institution-
alization of discovery’ (ibid., p. 226) and the ‘industrializa-
tion of invention’ (Meyer-Thurow, 1982, p. 363).8 
Science and engineering were pre-eminent in the best of 
these universities. Moreover, the 19th century also saw  
the rise of polytechnics and technical universities (Technis-
che Hochschulen), where engineering and applied sciences 
were paramount. These institutions were widely accessible,  
and mostly attended by the educated and rising middle 
classes of that period (Watson, 2010). The first steps were 
taken to create a public research laboratory system in 1887, 
on the instigation of entrepreneur-engineer Werner von 
Siemens, namely the Physikalisch-Technische Reichsan-
stalt (Beise and Stahl, 1999). Further organizations of this 
kind included the Kaiser Wilhelm Institutes, established in 
1911 on the instigation of the chemical industry, renamed 
the Max Planck Institutes after the Second World War. This 
8 As Watson (2010, p. 835) points out, ‘the concept of the modern  
PhD is a German idea’, and as stressed by Mroczkowski (2014, p. 412), 
‘the modern research university was actually a German institutional 
innovation’.
FIGURE 3: Economic take-off and industrialization in Germany, 1850 to 1913
 Net National Product, in billion 1913 Mark  Industrial Production, index l HDI, index
Notes: The industrial production and the HDI are indexes with a range from 0 (lowest) to 100 (highest). The industrial production data is indexed to 100 for the year 1913.
Data source: Authors’ own compilation based on `compromise’ data for the net national product (in billion 1913 marks) and 
industrial production data from Burshop and Wolff (2005, pp.651-653), and HDI data from Twarog (1997, p.322).  
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‘industrial research system’, influenced as much by entre-
preneurs and businessmen as by the government and  
scientists, was a first of its kind worldwide (Grupp et al., 
2005).
The scientific breakthroughs at universities and polytech-
nics were quickly taken up and applied for commercial pur-
poses by German entrepreneurs. An early example was the 
contributions of scientists such as Rudolf Clausius, Julius 
Mayer and Hermann von Helmholtz to the understanding  
of the generation and conservation of energy. Their inven-
tions stimulated engineer-entrepreneurs such as von  
Siemens to establish the firm of Siemens und Halske in  
1847, which manufactured the world’s first pointer tele-
graph, starting in effect the modern telecommunications 
industry. In 1851, Siemens invented the dynamo electrical  
machine which would contribute to the eventual promi-
nence of power engineering in Germany (Watson, 2010). 
Similarly, contributions in chemistry and organic chem-
istry led to the invention of synthetic color dyes, which – 
helped by the country’s large coal reserves – led Germany 
to become the world’s leading manufacturer of these  
(Meyer-Thurow, 1982).
The color-dyes industry developed into a global leading  
pharmaceutical industry with firms such as the Badische 
TABLE 1: Radical innovations in Germany, 1871 to 1913
Entrepreneur-Engineer Radical Innovation
Ernst Abbe (1840 – 1905) Optic lenses
Albert Ballin (1857 – 1918) Shipping lines (established the world’s largest shipping company by 1900)
Andreas Bauer (1783 – 1860) Steam powered printing press 
Karl Benz (1844 – 1929) 4-stroke automobile engine
Melitta Bentz (1873 – 1950) Coffee filter
Robert Bosch (1861 – 1942) Spark plug
Gottlieb Daimler (1834 – 1900) Internal combustion engine, motor cycle
Rudolf Diesel (1858 – 1913) Diesel engine
Alfred Einhorn (1856 – 1917) Novocaine
Paul Ehrlich (1854 – 1915) Chemotherapy 
Adolf Fick (1852 – 1937) Contact lenses
Carl Gassner (1855 – 1942) Dry cell battery
Hans Geiger (1882 – 1945) Geiger counter
Heinrich Hertz (1857 – 1894) Antenna
Fritz Hofmann (1871 – 1927) Synthetic rubber
 Felix Hoffmann (1868 – 1946) Heroin and aspirin
Christian Hülsmeyer (1881 – 1957) Radar (telemobiloscope)
Alfred Krupp (1812 – 1887) No-weld railway tires, steel (by 1900 his company was the largest in Europe)
Heinrich Lanz (1838 – 1905) Oil-fueled tractor 
Julius Pohlig (1842 – 1916) Cable car
Wilhelm Röntgen (1845 – 1923) X-rays
Werner von Siemens (1816 – 1892) Needle telegraph (today Siemens AG is the largest manufacturer in Europe)
Carl Zeiß (1816 – 1888) Lens manufacturing
Source: Authors’ own compilation.
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Anilin & Soda-Fabrik (BASF), Bayer, and Hoechst, introduc-
ing famous inventions such as the aspirin. The chemical 
and pharmaceutical industries led the way to the establish-
ment of private industrial research laboratories with their 
main purpose inventing and applying new inventions com-
mercially (Meyer-Thurow, 1982). In 1891, for instance, the 
firm of Bayer established its own industrial research labo-
ratory under the direction of Carl Duisberg; this facility was 
described as being superior to ‘every university laboratory 
then in existence’, although it relied on the universities to 
supply it with PhD chemists (ibid., p. 370).
The list of radical inventions by engineer-entrepreneurs 
during the late 19th and early 20th century is remarkable 
(Table 1). The legacy of these innovations has endured into 
present-day Germany: many of the largest German indus-
trial firms in the post-1950 period trace their roots back to 
this time, such as Siemens AG, Bosch AG, Bayer, Mannes-
mann, AEG, Thyssen and others.
The system that allowed them to become innovative, lead-
ing global firms has endured and was adapted over time to 
maintain their dominance in manufacturing, hence in the 
machinery, tools, automotive, and electrical engineering 
industries. As shown later in this study, however, the shift 
has been towards more incremental, rather than the radical 
innovations they pioneered during the ‘second industrial 
revolution’. In the period after 1950, and particularly after 
1980, Germany lost its global pre-eminence in generating 
radical innovations by failing to contribute to the sectors 
that defined the ‘fourth industrial revolution’. Many of the 
innovations driving this new industrial revolution, such as 
in ICT, originated outside Germany, in particular in coun-
tries such as the United States, Japan, and South Korea.
The examples given in the text and in Table 1 reflect the 
close cooperation between higher education and industry  
that was established during the period 1871 to 1913. This 
‘organizational’ innovation was complemented by further  
changes in German industry, such as the establishment of 
cartels (‘Interessengemeinschaft’) that fixed prices and 
market shares, and which, according to Watson (2010), 
helped to fund the R&D activities undertaken by the grow-
ing industrial companies. The extent of privately funded 
R&D activities increased substantially and led to the estab-
lishment of various private research laboratories. One 
of these research labs, owned by Bayer, held around 
8,000 patents by 1913 (Meyer-Thurow, 1982).
The third partner in the emerging innovation system after 
1871 was the government. Not only did national and state 
governments (i. e., the Länder) support universal education,  
but they also provided what many saw as the spark for  
Germany’s industrialization through the promotion of  
the country’s railway system (Fohlin, 1998). The railways  
created big demand for steel, engines and machinery, but 
also for coal and coal-based energy (of which the coun-
try had plenty), and helped, in turn, to reduce transport 
costs, thereby improving the competitiveness of all indus-
tries and both internal and external trade (Kopsidis and 
Bromley, 2016). By 1913 the largest employers in Germany 
were state-owned enterprises such as the Prussian-Hessian 
Railway (more than 500,000) and the Deutsche Reichspost 
(more than 300,000) (Labuske and Streb, 2008). Since  
a degree was a requirement for many government jobs,  
the higher education system experienced a huge boost, and 
confirmed its importance as a central pillar in the develop-
ment of the economy and civil society.
Mechanical engineering and specifically machinery manu-
facturing were given an important impetus by the railways, 
and at the same time, by the emerging innovation system. 
As a result, Germany was able to expand into international 
markets. Labuske and Streb (2008) find a significant impact 
of innovation (as measured by R&D expenditure) on the 
development and export growth of the mechanical engi-
neering industry between 1870 and 1913. By the latter date, 
exports of machinery were the single largest category of 
exports from Germany that also rated top exporter in this 
industrial sector. The beginning of Germany’s manufactur-
ing export model can thus be traced back to this era.
The mechanical engineering industry was also highly inno-
vative, with half of the most inventive firms of that time 
located in this sector (Labuske and Streb, 2008). Many of 
them are still prominent in Germany, for instance Heinrich  
Lanz AG, producing agricultural machinery (taken over  
in the 1950s by John Deere), Demag (Deutsche Maschi- 
nenbau-Aktiengesellschaft) producing industrial cranes, 
Rheinmetall AG, producing automotive parts and weapons, 
and Bosch AG, the largest producer of automobile parts. 
In 1890 the Deutsch-Österreichische Mannesmannröhren 
Werke AG was established to produce steel pipes. This com-
pany would develop into the industrial conglomerate Man-
nesmann AG that was taken over in 2000 by Vodafone for 
EUR 190 billion, the biggest value acquisition in Europe at 
that time.
More generally, the creation of the German Empire in 1871 
centralized government and further increased the economic 
freedom and entrepreneurship that had already started 
in the late 18th century by reducing the control of various 
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industry and trade guilds that were stifling competition and 
innovation (Ogilvie, 1996; Kopsidis and Bromley, 2016).9
Although some state governments granted patents from 
around 1812 onward, it was only in 1877 that the first Ger-
many-wide (unified) patent legislation was enacted by the 
new centralized government. This was important in terms 
of creating incentives for research, and also of creating a 
tradable market of innovations to facilitate technological  
transfer10 and improve the allocation and distribution of 
technology (Meyer-Thurow, 1982; Burhop and Wolff, 2013).
It should be noted that rather woeful historical events also 
affected the government’s capacity to foster innovation and 
growth. France’s reparation payments (around 5 billion 
9 Ogilvie (1996, pp. 286-287) describes the Luddite impact of the guilds 
on innovation by explaining how ‘the Remscheid scythe smith’s guild 
successfully resisted the introduction of water-driven scythe ham-
mers in the 18th century’. The guilds were an outcome of the Thirty 
Years’ War which ‘forced German Princes to grant and enforce priv-
ileges to powerful institutions and groups […] in exchange for fiscal, 
military and political support’. They ‘prevented the emergence of  
industries in the period between 1600 and 1800’ (ibid., p. 297).
10 As noted by Burhop and Wolff (2013) the trade in innovations, as 
measured by patent assignments, increased by 500 percent between 
1889 and 1913.
Francs) after the Franco-Prussian War led to a huge inflow 
of money into the newly established German Empire in the 
years after 1871. The government, repaying loans to entre-
preneurs and businesses that had supported it to finance 
the war, reinvested these funds on a massive scale in com-
mercializing innovations and in expanding the railways. As 
Watson (2010, p. 374) notes, ‘as many new iron works, blast 
furnaces, and machine-manufacturing factories were built 
during the three years after 1871, as had come into being 
during the previous seventy’.
After the creation of the German Empire, corporate legisla-
tion was introduced to allow joint stock companies for the 
first time. This had a decisive influence on the financing of 
innovation and industrialization, especially towards the end 
of the 19th century, when big joint stock credit houses such 
as Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank, and others were founded 
(Burhop and Wolff, 2005). As Fohlin (1998) shows, it was 
not the big credit banks or security issues that funded 
industrial expansion during the initial stages of Germany’s 
industrialization, but largely self-funding, credit coopera-
tives, and (outside of Prussia) monies from private bank-
ers that funded entrepreneurial ventures, and the states 
that financed the railways’ expansion (Edwards and Ogilvie, 
FIGURE 4: Per capita GDP growth in Germany, 1850 to 1913, in percent
 Percentage change to previous year  Long-term trend
Source: Maddison Project  
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1996). The banking system as a whole developed in tandem 
with the industrial sector during the latter half of the 19th 
century.
Finally, an important ‘social innovation’ during the German 
Empire was the establishment of the world’s first welfare 
state (the German Sozialstaat). This was deemed necessary 
for social stability, and moreover was a political stratagem  
to ward off the rising socialist movement. The provision of 
these measures, which included health care and maternity 
insurance (introduced in 1883), insurance against injury 
at work (1884) and old-age pension (1889) contributed 
to social inclusiveness. Williamson (1995) concludes that 
income inequality hardly changed in Germany during the 
period 1850 to 1913 despite the rise in top incomes, partly 
because the wages of low-skilled workers increased faster 
than in other industrial countries.
As indicated in Figure 3, using the Human Development 
Index (HDI), incomes, literacy, and life expectation all 
improved significantly, showing that growing industrial 
production and a higher net national product were accom-
panied by a rise in HDI. Moreover, as Figure 4 shows, eco-
nomic growth accelerated during this period – which is in 
stark contrast to the post-1950 period when it decelerated.11
The lesson of this period is that technological innovations,  
supported by appropriate social protection, could be con-
sistent with fast economic growth that was moreover 
inclusive – it did not lead to growing income inequality, 
and instead strongly contributed to human development  
for the population as a whole. 
3.2  Wirtschaftswunder, declining innovation 
and rising inequality: 1950 to 2015
Between 1914 and the creation of the Federal Republic of 
Germany with its Constitution in 1949, the economy and 
its institutions were devastated by the two World Wars. 
Despite these, many of the pillars of the German Empire, 
including numerous 19th-century corporate giants and  
scientific and educational institutions, survived. Under 
pressure from the Allied Forces occupying Germany after 
the Second World War, the Kaiser Wilhelm Institutes were 
renamed Max Planck Institutes. Moreover, the Allied Forces 
11 Although income inequality remained stable and the HDI improved 
during this period, the country still faced many social hardships,  
including the use of child labor and urban poverty.
limited their mandate to basic research (Comin et al., 2016). 
To fill the gap in the former ‘triple-helix’ landscape, the 
Fraunhofer Society (FhG) was established in 1949. The  
FhG nowadays consists of a number of research laboratories 
that conduct applied research and industrial innovation for 
improving the competitiveness of industry (Beise and Stahl, 
1999). Despite its prominence, only a relative small propor-
tion of total R&D in Germany is allocated to the FhG (about 
2.5 percent of all R&D in 2010).
Grupp et al. (2005) depict historic innovation patterns in 
Germany from 1850 until 2000. They use total scientific 
expenditure as a percentage of total government expend-
iture as an indicator for innovation. Scientific spending 
includes R&D, training and teaching costs, and the costs of 
maintenance and diffusion of knowledge. The authors find 
that innovation expenditure increased during this period 
from around 1 percent in 1850 to a maximum of 6.5 percent 
in the 1970s, before declining to approximately 5 percent at 
the time of German unification. R&D expenditure amounted 
to just 2.4 percent in 2004 (see also Figure 9 in Section 4.2). 
When comparing this trend with data on TFP growth for 
the post-war period, it can be seen that this peaked in the 
1970s after which it declined.
Accompanying this decline, Germany has experienced one 
in manufacturing employment and in the share of manufac- 
turing in GDP. The extent of this de-industrialization pro-
cess, however, has not been as significant as, for instance, 
in the United States, where more than 5 million jobs in 
manufacturing were lost between 2000 and 2014 (Dauth  
et al., 2017a).
Economic growth accelerated in terms of per capita GDP 
over the period 1850 to 1913. Between 1850 and 1869 aver-
age growth amounted to 1.6 percent a year. Between 1870 
and 1899 it increased to 2.5 percent, and in the period  
1900 to 1913 accelerated even further to 2.8 percent (see 
Figure 4). In sharp contrast, the period 1950 to 2010 expe- 
rienced a deceleration in per capita economic growth.  
Initially though, between 1950 and the mid-1970s, aver-
age annual GDP per capita growth amounted to 5.0 per-
cent. During this period West Germany experienced its 
Wirtschaftswunder (economic miracle). Growth was driven 
by reconstruction under the Marshall Plan and the intro-
duction of social market policies, including the model 
of Mitbestimmung (co-management) in which workers 
obtained representation on the supervisory board (Comin 
et al., 2016). Growth, however, subsequently declined to an 
average 2.0 percent between 1975 and 1990, and further to 
1.0 percent between 1990 and 2010 (see Figure 5). During 
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this latter period Germany was described as the ‘Sick Man 
of Europe’.
Audretsch and Lehmann (2016) point out that even before 
unification German ‘competitiveness began to sag’, and that 
while everybody had expected a ‘peace dividend’ after it and 
the end of the Cold War, this never materialized, because the 
unification process was accompanied by a negative shock to 
labor productivity. This was a result of the re-integration 
of workers from the former East Germany, whose produc-
tivity was 40 to 70 percent of that of West German workers. 
This shock occurred just as the country was ‘exposed to new 
global competition’ post-Cold War (ibid., p. 4). 
What have been the reasons for this secular decline in  
productivity in Germany since the 1970s? Most scholars  
point to the nature of the innovation system. According 
to Breznitz (2014), the German system ‘got stuck’ at pro-
ducing primarily incremental innovations in existing (and 
old) industries, rather than radically innovating and cre-
ating new industries and markets. Meyer-Thurow (1982) 
states that a major goal of R&D expenditure by individual 
companies was to prevent new firms/competitors entering 
the market rather than creating new markets. Erixon and 
Weigel (2016, p. 59) describe the strategies of large German 
corporations as being essentially ‘defensive’, in that they 
‘favor the allocation of resources according to a rentier  
formula; and it crowds out innovations’. As an example, 
Meyer-Thurow (1982, pp. 380-381) conducted a case study 
of the pharmaceutical giant Bayer AG and concluded that 
the company’s innovation system was,
‘[e]xtremely effective at maintaining and extending the compa-
ny’s superiority whenever it had established itself in the market 
[…]. But when Bayer tried to break into markets established by 
other companies or break new technical and scientific ground, 
industrial research proved less effective […] industrial research 
was not a master key to entrepreneurial growth.’
Not only was incremental innovation the strategy of choice 
for large corporate giants, but also for the Mittelstand,12 
although for different reasons. The model of incremental 
12 The term Mittelstand refers to the small- and medium-sized enter-
prises that form the bulk of manufacturing enterprises in the country. 
They have a number of characteristics in common, which are referred 
to as ‘enlightened family capitalism’, such as family (private) own-
ership, long-term orientation, social responsibility, and an excellent 
focus on customer care (Fear et al., 2015, p. 13). Most Mittelstand firms 
have historically clustered around the traditional late 19th and early 
20th century giants of the German economy such as the automotive, 
machine engineering, electricity, and chemical industries. Many of 
these firms were also founded during this era, or even before. 
FIGURE 5: Per capita GDP growth in Germany, 1950 to 2010, in percent
 Percentage change to previous year  Long-term trend
Source: Maddison Project  
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innovation adopted by the Mittelstand is to remain inter- 
nationally competitive on the basis of quality, not costs.  
Today more than 70 percent of Germany’s exports are from 
Mittelstand firms. German firms therefore continuously 
innovated to improve their existing products and services, 
but not to introduce novel products per se. This focus on 
quality has been described as a ‘razor-thin focus on just a 
single product’ (Girotra and Netessine, 2013). As Fear et al. 
(2015, p. 12) explain,
‘By and large, German companies are not pioneering leaders  
in basic innovations […] rather they demonstrate technological 
excellence by applying basic innovations to solve customer- 
specific needs, and in the meticulous and customer-driven  
perfection of traditional products.’
By combining incremental innovation in the output of  
specific products of exceptional quality with a focus on  
customer needs, in the context of a growing globalization  
of the world economy in the 20th century, a focus on 
exports overseas gave these Mittelstand firms the chance to 
make use of economies of scale. Over time, many of these 
firms became world leaders in their field, being described 
as Germany’s ‘hidden champions’ (Simon, 2009). In 2015, 
the top 20 ‘hidden champions’ had a turnover of over EUR 
7 billion and employed more than 72,000 (see Table 3 in 
the Appendix). Fear et al. (2015) argue that the success of 
Mittelstand firms is not so much driven by their innovative 
abilities, as by doing ‘good business’: their focus on cus-
tomer needs and quality, reliable products and services.
As outlined before, while Germany today is a leader in  
traditional and medium technology industries such as 
automobiles, printing press and machine tools, it is not  
one in semiconductors, computing, 3D-printing, nano- 
technology, robotics or molecular biology – the drivers  
of what has been termed the ‘fourth industrial revolu-
tion’ or ‘Industrie 4.0’13 (Mroczkowski, 2014). Data from 
the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) show 
that only four German firms are among the top 30 innova-
tive companies in the areas of 3D-printing, nanotechnology 
and robotics, as measured in terms of patent applications. 
Three of these are in 3D-printing, namely Siemens, MTU 
Aero Engines and EOS; and one in robotics, Bosch (WIPO, 
2015). Increasingly, German firms lag behind those from 
the United States, Japan, South Korea, and also China. The 
WIPO (2015) notes that 25 percent of all patent applica-
13 The term Industrie 4.0 is ascribed to Henning Kagermann, head of  
the German Academy of Science and Engineering (Acatech) (The 
Economist, 2015).
tions in 3D-printing and robotics, and 15 percent in nano-
technology, have been made by Chinese firms since 2005. 
Moreover, the top 20 patent applicants in nanotechnology 
have not included a single German firm since 1970.
This section concludes that the decline in Germany’s inno-
vativeness, from a world leader in breakthrough innova-
tions to a country where incremental process innovations 
dominate, makes inclusive growth more difficult to achieve, 
particularly given slow growth in domestic demand and the 
imperative to remain internationally competitive. Hence, 
policy measures have been taken to reduce the real cost of 
labor and thereby improve the economy’s competitiveness 
and reduce pressure on fiscal resources. Whereas in the 
past technological innovation promoted inclusive growth,  
it is becoming less effective. The following section docu-
ments this decline in more detail.
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4  Documenting the decline  
in German innovativeness
reasons are discussed in the next section. It can however 
be noted that patents are far from being a perfect meas-
ure of innovativeness, warranting some caution in making 
strong conclusions. For instance, patent offices may simply 
be getting more stringent, or the growth in the number of 
applications might not be quality-driven, but the inclina-
tion to submit applications may have increased over time. 
4.2 Exhibit 2: Declining rates of growth  
in productivity
The second piece of evidence derives from data on labor 
productivity and total factor productivity (TFP). TFP growth 
has been declining in Germany since the 1970s, down to a 
rate of only 0.5 percent per annum over the past ten years 
(OECD, 2016). As the OECD (2016, p. 6) notes, TFP growth 
has been on a long-term decline since the 1970s. Over the 
period 1996 to 2005 it averaged 0.4 percent, which makes 
Germany 34th out of 37 OECD countries. Only Portugal, 
Italy and Spain did worse.
Figure 7 shows that German TFP grew annually by over 
2.5 percent on average between 1961 and 1970. This growth 
declined over the subsequent decades, with the lowest 
annual rate experienced from 2001 to 2010, at just 0.4 per-
cent. Recently annual TFP growth has seen a moderate 
increase, up to an average of 0.7 percent between 2011 and 
2014, on a par with the decade from 1991 to 2000. 
The 1960s were thus, at least as measured by TFP, Ger-
many’s period of ‘peak innovation’, although there was 
no comparable list of breakthrough innovations as in the 
period from 1850 to 1913. The decline from the late 1970s 
onward, and especially since the 1990s, may be explained 
by a lack of radical innovations in the field of ICT (defin-
ing the ‘third industrial revolution’), a slower diffusion of 
technology, and a slower capacity to learn and adapt new 
technologies, as the OECD (2016) posits – which may also 
This section substantiates the conclusion that the German 
economy’s innovativeness has declined over the past half 
century. This may appear counter-intuitive given that Ger-
many’s investment in stimulating technological innovation  
is large and growing. For instance, in 2014 the country spent 
more than EUR 80 billion on R&D, an increase of 66 percent 
on 2000. But various pieces of evidence are here presented, 
using different measures of ‘innovation’, to show a con-
sistent picture of Germany generating less and less effec-
tive innovations, despite channeling significant amounts  
of investment into this area of economic activity.
4.1  Exhibit 1: A growing gap between  
applied and granted patents
This first piece of evidence is derived from patent data,  
a frequent ‘output’ indicator of innovation. An important  
distinction lies between patent applications and patents  
granted. The difference rests in the ratio of successful 
(granted) patents to applications (see Figure 6). The recent 
trend in Germany has been a reduction in the ratio of  
patents granted to applications.
In absolute terms the number of patent applications in- 
creased from around 43,100 in the mid-1980s (FRG only)  
to almost 66,900 in 2014, but the number of successful  
(granted) patents decreased from around 21,700 in the 
mid-1980s to only 14,800 in 2014. In other words, Ger- 
many has experienced a decline in the number of ‘success-
ful’ innovations,14 and this has coincided with the period  
in which income inequality rose. 
In so far as the decline in successful (granted) patent  
applications reflects one in innovativeness, the broad  
14 Germany also experienced a decline in the quality of its patents 
granted at the USPTO relative to the United States between 1980  
and 2011 (Kwon et al., 2017).
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FIGURE 6: Ratio patent applications to patents granted and the Gini coefficient, 1985 to 2014
 Ratio of patents granted to patent applications (before 1990 FRG only)  Gini (pre T&T), Gini coefficient  Gini (post T&T), Gini coefficient
Notes: From the mid-1980s to the German reunification in 1990, only patent data from the FRG.
Source: WIPO (Patents) and OECD (Gini coefficient). 
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FIGURE 8: Percentage change in real labor productivity (output per hour worked), 1992 to 2013, in percent
 Percentage change to previous year  Long-term trend
Source: European Commission AMECO database online. 
–2.5
–2.0
–1.5
–1.0
–0.5
0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
FIGURE 9: Labor productivity per person employed and R&D expenditure, 2004 to 2015
 Index of labor productivity  R&D expenditure (in % of GDP)
Notes: Nominal labor productivity per person employed and hour worked (EU28 average =100 in each year).
Source: Eurostat (Index of labor productivity) and OECD (R&D expenditure). 
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reflect the relatively slower growth in high(er) skills acqui-
sition in Germany over this period. Baumgarten (2013, p. 5) 
finds that ‘German establishments invested more in tech-
nology during the 1980s than during recent years, showing 
that while 34 percent of firms invested in ICT in 1996,  
only 29 percent did so in 2010.’ Thus, the decline in labor 
productivity occurred in spite of the rising share of GDP 
spent on R&D. Innovation expenditure has become less 
effective.
Figure 8 further shows that the percentage change in real 
labor productivity per hour worked has been on a longterm  
decline since the 1990s. Labor productivity growth rates 
were five times lower in 2013 than in 1992. Figure 9 con-
trasts the index of labor productivity, showing that it has 
overall declined since 2004 (relative to the EU 28), despite 
an upward blip after the Great Recession in 2008/2009, 
with R&D intensity, defined as gross domestic expenditure 
on R&D. This increased considerably over the same period, 
especially from the mid-2000s, peaking at almost 3 per- 
cent in 2014.15 The figure makes clear that R&D expenditure 
(innovation), since 2004 at least, has not contributed to 
raising labor productivity relative to other European coun-
tries.16  
4.3  Exhibit 3: Labor hours worked, 
productivity and labor compensation
From 1950 the annual hours worked by the average German 
worker declined from just over 2,400 hours to less than 
1,400 by 2015. This decline has historical roots, having 
started as early as under the German Empire.17 In fact,  
Germany has experienced the fastest fall in annual aver-
age hours worked per employee compared to the United 
Kingdom, France, and the United States (see Figure 10). 
This sharp decline can be explained by the growing power 
of unions, by higher incomes (raising the value of leisure), 
and also by the low (and even declining) levels of inequality 
15 These declines in productivity are highly unlikely, as some have  
argued, to be due to mismeasurement of the value-added effects of 
ICT technologies. Syverson (2017) counters these arguments, conclud-
ing that ‘[f]or the mismeasurement hypothesis to explain the produc-
tivity slowdown […] current GDP measures must be missing  
hundreds of billions of dollars in incremental output’.
16 Bloom et al. (2017, p. 46) similarly find that research productivity  
declined in the United States over the period 1930 to 2000, stating  
that ‘[j]ust to sustain constant growth in GDP per person, the US 
must double the amount of research effort searching for new ideas 
every 13 years’.
17 In 1870 the average worker worked for almost 68 hours per week  
in Germany. By 1913, this had fallen to 57 hours, and by 2000 to only 
41 hours (Huberman and Minns, 2007).
in Germany during the 20th century. The latter is an inter-
esting point given the conclusion by Huberman and Minns 
(2007), that hours of work will decline more rapidly in 
more equal societies, because of the lower opportunity  
costs of working more.
This decline in working hours is also based on increasing  
productivity over time, rendered possible by technological  
innovation and capital investment. This is why, even 
though average annual hours worked substantially declined 
over recent decades, employment and wages have grown. 
Wages, however, have grown increasingly more slowly 
and, furthermore, by less than labor productivity. In fact, 
labor productivity growth has been slowing down – which 
stands in contrast to the view that robots replace humans 
in the workplace. As Yglesias (2015) points out, following 
substantial replacement of humans by robots, one would 
expect the labor productivity of those still with jobs to 
surge.
As Figure 10 and the previous section make clear, labor 
productivity is not increasing fast enough to lend credence 
to the idea that robots are taking over. Notably, Dauth et al. 
(2017b, p. 1) find that there is ‘no evidence that robots cause 
total job losses’ in Germany, in spite of the fact that the 
number of robots per workforce in Germany exceeds that  
of the United States and other European countries.18
A final piece of evidence in this regard can be shown by 
comparing average annual growth in worker compensa- 
tion with growth in GDP per worker (see Figure 11). Since 
1991, GDP growth per worker has generally exceeded any 
increase in worker compensation – hence, a proportion-
ately larger share was directed towards capital, consist-
ent with the finding of higher income inequality over this 
period – except for the most recent period 2011 to 2015, 
when workers received proportionately more than their 
GDP share.19
The period 2011 to 2015 was also the period most intensely 
affected by the ‘fourth industrial revolution’ technologies  
(Industrie 4.0), such as robotics. Clearly, these technologies  
are not consistent with higher income inequality in the 
data (yet). This finding is the opposite of what would be 
18 The authors do find however that robots cause reduced employment 
in manufacturing: not through job losses for incumbent workers,  
but by restricting jobs for new labor market entrants. The robots,  
in contrast, even help incumbent workers to maintain their jobs 
(Dauth et al., 2017b).
19 Based on OECD data, average wage growth was particularly low from 
the mid-1990s onward, and even 0 or negative during the 2000s.  
Only since 2010 has average wage growth started to rise again.
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FIGURE 10: Average annual working hours, 1950 to 2014
 Germany  United States  United Kingdom  France
Source: Penn World Table 9.0. 
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FIGURE 11: Average annual growth in worker compensation and GDP per worker, 1991 to 2015, in percent
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expected if technological growth was ‘too fast’ for workers 
to adjust, or if robots were indeed taking over people’s jobs.
4.4  Exhibit 4: The relative scarcity of venture 
capital investment
Venture capital (VC) investment is sometimes used as an 
indicator of innovation, since it is generally employed to 
finance high-tech start-ups, particularly in the ICT indus-
try. Fohlin (2016) describes how the VC market expanded 
in the United States in the late 1970s in tandem with the 
ICT revolution. The location of VC investments also gives 
an indication of where radically innovative firms oper-
ate. Florida and King (2016) estimate the total value of 
VC investment worldwide at USD 42 billion in 2012. Of 
this, only 13.5 percent was invested in Europe; and within 
Europe, Germany’s share was relatively small, behind the 
United Kingdom, France, Denmark, and Russia. The authors 
report, for instance, that among the top ten European cities 
for VC investment, there were only three from Germany  
(Berlin, Stuttgart, Munich), and that among the top 20 global 
cities for VC investment there was no German city at all.
Germany does not stand out in terms of VC – on the con-
trary, it is lagging behind, compared to the United States, 
China, and other emerging market regions. Consider, for 
instance, Figure 12, where VC investment is compared 
between the United States and Germany, in percent of GDP, 
between 2007 and 2016. The graph indicates that there has 
been a surge in VC investment in the United States since 
2013, reaching more than 0.4 percent of GDP by 2015, which 
amounted to almost 20 times the proportion of VC invest-
ment in Germany.
In 2014, the VC investment in only two US city-regions  
(San Francisco and New York) was already ten times the 
overall VC investment in Germany. Other city-regions, such 
as Beijing, have also experienced more than double the VC  
investments compared to Germany as a whole, as Figure 
13 indicates. Moreover, data show that the volume of VC 
investments by non-member companies in Germany has 
declined from EUR 864 million in 2007 to EUR 607 million 
in 2014. 
Comin et al. (2016) consider the relative lack of VC in  
Germany a symptom of an ‘innovation crisis’, which the 
Ifo Institute for Economic Research in Munich had already 
FIGURE 12: Venture capital investment in the United States and Germany, 2007 to 2016, in percent of GDP
 United States  Germany
Source: Authors’ own compilation based on data from Statista. 
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identified two decades ago. Audretsch and Lehmann (2016, 
p. 5) quote Der Spiegel and The Wall Street Journal, describ-
ing Germany’s computer chip, biotechnology and energy 
industries as ‘disasters’ by the 1990s. Comin et al. (2016, 
p. 417) further describe how the Neuer Markt (new market) 
for high-risk start-up finance collapsed, and how a host of 
government policies since 1989, intended to stimulate new 
emerging technologies such as biotechnology, was deemed 
to have largely ‘disappointed’ by 1998. The ROBO Global 
Robotics and Automation Index contains data on financial 
performance of 1,000 companies in the industry, of which 
only 4 percent are from Germany. The bulk of firms are 
from the United States (42 percent) and Japan (30 percent).
FIGURE 13: Venture capital investment in selected 
world cities and regions, 2014, in billion USD
Source: Authors’ own compilation based on 
data from Florida and King (2016). 
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5 The causes of decline in German 
innovativeness
missal of Jewish scientists, including eleven Nobel Lau-
reates such as Albert Einstein, Max Born, Fritz Haber and 
Otto Meyerhof, from public institutions by the Nazis after 
1933, had a long-term negative impact on scientific output. 
Furthermore, after the Second World War, the Allied Forces 
required research institutes to focus only on basic research 
to the detriment of application and commercialization. As 
various historians point out: what disadvantaged Germany, 
advantaged the United States.
A further institutional feature that may have contributed 
to the decline in innovation is the drop in union density 
over the past three decades. In Section 6 (below) the study 
shows that unionization reached a peak in 1991 and subse-
quently declined. This may have contributed to the slower 
and poorer diffusion of technologies. In this regard Addison 
et al. (2013) find evidence that unionization has been bene-
ficial for innovation in the past, because the participation  
of workers in management helped new technology adoption 
and diffusion. Over the more recent past, however, the 
power of unions has diminished.
5.2 Lack of diversity and innovativeness  
in the education system
The decline in innovation can also be traced to the coun-
try’s education system.20 Two main problems are identi-
fied: first, it may be too specialized and intertwined with 
20 The weaknesses of a generally much-praised education system have 
been reflected in the relatively poor and, at times, even declining  
position of Germany in global skills rankings. In terms of the Global 
Talent Index, for instance, Germany is ranked 16th in the ‘Creative 
Class Ranking’, 28th in the ‘Talent Ranking’, and only 38th in its  
‘Educational Attainment’ (Florida et al., 2015). In the Global Index of 
Cognitive Skills and Educational Attainment Germany ranked 12th out 
of 39 countries in terms of ‘Cognitive Skills’, measured by Grade 8 PISA 
(Programme for International Student Assessment) Scores and Grade 
4 PIRLS (Progress in International Reading Literacy Study) and TIMMS 
(Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study) achievements 
in sciences and mathematics, in 2014. Its score in the ‘Index of Cogni-
tive Skills’ declined from 0.56 to 0.48 between 2012 and 2014.
Promoting itself as the Land der Ideen (Land of Ideas),  
Germany invests heavily in stimulating technological inno-
vation. Despite this investment and effort, the impact of 
technological innovation on labor productivity growth con-
tinues to decline. The previous section offered four pieces of 
evidence that, separately and collectively, strongly support 
the idea of a decline in the effectiveness of innovation. The 
question arises why this has been declining – particularly, 
why has productivity been declining despite the rise in R&D 
spending? Only by understanding the causes of this decline 
can policy interventions be designed that have the poten-
tial to revive the contribution of technological innovation to 
inclusive growth. Three main reasons are discussed in this 
section: first, the historical legacy and institutional context, 
as Germany lost a large portion of its intelligentsia during 
and after the Second World War; second, weaknesses in the 
education system; and third, entrepreneurial stagnation.
5.1 Historic legacy and institutional context
Fohlin (2016, pp. 18-19) identifies the Second World War  
as representing a structural break in Germany’s innova-
tiveness, with a subsequent decline due to a combination  
of factors, including war destruction, the effects of the Cold 
War, the division of the country until 1990, and the subse-
quent costs of unification. Given this particular combina-
tion, the author concludes that ‘Germany could not pour 
large portions of its national resources into risky invest-
ments in research and development of new technologies’.  
Germany also experienced a significant brain drain, when 
highly skilled labor fled the country during and after the 
Nazi period (Fohlin, 2016). The detrimental and long-run  
impacts of the human capital loss on Germany’s skills 
are discussed in Moser et al. (2014) and Waldinger (2016). 
Moser et al. (2014, p. 3222) document that ‘[b]y 1944, more 
than 133,000 German Jewish émigrés found refuge in the 
United States’ and show that in the field of chemistry, for 
instance, their contributions had a significant impact on  
US patenting. Waldinger (2016) estimates that the dis-
32
Technological Innovation and Inclusive Growth in Germany
the current industrial structure; and second, it may be 
‘un-entrepreneurial’ and too bureaucratic.
One specialization of the German education system is 
rooted in the important role of manufacturing within its 
economy. Manufacturing value-added contributed 23 per-
cent to GDP, and manufactures exports 84 percent to ex- 
ports of goods in 2016; 28 percent of its labor force was 
employed in industry, consisting of manufacturing, mining 
and construction 2015.21 Iversen and Cusack (2000) point 
out that the reallocation of workers from manufacturing to 
services seems to have been easier in the United States, and 
argue that in Germany it is more difficult to transfer skills 
to another sector, because of the more specialist type of 
skills. Many skills in Germany are firm-specific, especially 
in the typical Mittelstand manufacturing businesses.22 The 
challenge in Germany is thus the transferability of skills. 
The authors warn (ibid., p. 346) that ‘[a] country like Ger-
many with a training system that emphasizes specific skills 
will be politically more sensitive to occupational shifts than 
a country like the US where the educational system empha-
sizes general skills’.
As indicated in Table 2, Germany’s tertiary education 
enrolments are relatively more concentrated or special-
ized than those of fellow OECD countries such as France, 
21 Data source: World Development Indicators.
22 ‘Most skills acquired, in either manufacturing or in agriculture, travel 
very poorly to service occupations’ (Iversen and Cusack, 2000, p. 327).
Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States. In 2014, 
around 21 percent of all tertiary education enrolments were 
in engineering, manufacturing and construction programs, 
almost three times as much as in the United States, and 
twice as much as in France or the United Kingdom. By way 
of contrast, Germany has the lowest percentage of tertiary 
students enrolled in education programs in health/welfare 
and in social sciences, in comparison to those countries. In 
the former, it has proportionately almost three times less 
students than the United States. In services study programs 
Germany also has relatively few students, at 2.15 percent 
compared to 7.01 percent in the United States. It is not per 
se a problem having many engineering students, it is rather 
the students missing in other fields that limit the ability of 
the labor market to adjust. 
The overall conclusion from this table is that, compared with 
other high-income OECD countries where manufacturing has 
traditionally played an important role, Germany’s tertiary 
student population is more heavily specialized in engineer-
ing and manufacturing right up to today. It is less diverse 
compared with the United States, where most students are in 
fields such as health and welfare, arts and humanities, busi-
ness and law, and social sciences. Germany, however, also 
has proportionally more students in ICT technology pro-
grams than in any of these countries, which should be a  
positive attribute in terms of future labor market demands. 
It has been also argued, however, that it is precisely jobs  
in ICT, such as in programming and coding, that can most 
easily be performed by computers rather than humans.
TABLE 2: Comparison of tertiary education enrollment by field, 2014
Percentage of students in tertiary education enrolled in 2014 DEU FRA ITA GBR USA
Engineering, Manufacturing and Construction 21.00 11.93 17.03 9.20 7.65
Information and Communication Technologies 6.18 2.71 1.36 4.09 3.76
Business, Administration and Law 22.42 27.78 20.97 17.72 17.03
Natural Sciences, Mathematics and Statistics 10.20 6.51 6.71 14.59 6.03
Services 2.15 3.16 2.34 1.54 7.01
Arts and Humanities 13.48 13.33 15.24 16.12 17.47
Health and Welfare 6.94 15.91 15.53 17.00 18.24
Social Sciences, Journalism and Information 7.09 9.12 12.39 8.87 10.47
Agriculture, Forestry, Fisheries and Veterinary 1.58 1.14 2.63 1.04 0.64
Unspecified Fields 0.11 5.38 0.72 2.38 4.10
Source: Authors’ own compilation based on the UNESCO Education Database.
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Owing to the tendency to produce relatively more specific 
and uneasily transferable skills, the German government 
has increasingly de facto opted to encourage workers to exit 
the labor market through early retirement on a pension (an 
expensive manner to deal with the challenge), as well as 
self-employment (labor market deregulation). The result of 
both has been greater wage dispersion – and thus income 
inequality. In addition, it has driven up the uncertainty of 
employment, lowered the quality of jobs while increasing 
wage poverty, added to income inequality, and put the fis-
cal position of the state under pressure – the social welfare 
system relies heavily on transfers (Seeleib-Kaiser, 2001). 
This, overall, offers a possible explanation for the current 
‘malaise’ and feeling of living in a divided society referred 
to in the introduction.
As well as being relatively specialized, the German educa-
tion system may not able to keep up the ‘production’ and 
‘delivery’ of the highly skilled workers needed in the R&D 
sector. Figure 14 plots the relationship between growth in 
the number of R&D researchers and TFP growth in selected 
OECD countries between 1996 and 2005. It shows that 
Germany had one of the lowest levels of growth in R&D 
researcher numbers – and, at the same time, one of the 
lowest TFP growth levels. Indeed, it is notable that the 
R&D intensity in manufacturing is lower than in Japan, the 
United States, France and South Korea, despite the impor-
tance of manufacturing for jobs and exports in Germany.23
Why has the education system not been more dynamic  
in the light of these weaknesses? The conclusion suggests 
that higher education has been relatively stagnant due to a 
lack of incentives to be in any way innovative. Fohlin (2016, 
pp. 19-20) points out that ‘[…] academics became govern-
ment employees with neither the pressure of private incen-
tives, nor the competition from private universities to spur 
research productivity’. Education policy is fragmented 
across the 16 Länder, the dual vocational system is difficult  
to enter and is limited to 378 formal occupations; overall,  
the education system is too much tailored to industrial 
needs (Malmer and Tholen, 2015). According to Mrocz-
kowski (2014, pp. 415-416), ‘[t]he country that invented  
the ‘triple-helix’, today is criticized for insufficient entre-
preneurship and innovation, and for coddling university 
academics who are described as conservative, inward-look-
ing, and resistant to change’.
23 As documented by Veugelers (2013), German manufacturers spend on 
average 8 percent of value added on R&D, compared to 12 percent in 
Japan, 11 percent in the United States, and 10 percent in France.
FIGURE 14: Growth in R&D researchers and TFP growth in selected OECD countries, 1996 to 2005, in percent 
 Fitted line
Notes: Growth in R&D researchers refers to 1996 to 2005, with the following deviations: AUS, CHE (1996-2004);  
FIN, NOR, NZL, SWE (1997-2005); AUT (1998-2005); LUX (2000-2005).
Data source: Authors’ own compilation based on data from Welfens (2015, p.480, average TFP growth data derived from the 
European Commission AMECO database online) and the World Bank Development Indicators online (number of researchers). 
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5.3 Entrepreneurial stagnation
A third broad reason for the decline in the effectiveness  
of innovation is what can broadly be described as entrepre-
neurial stagnation.24 This does not refer to a general lack  
of entrepreneurship, nor of business firms in the economy. 
It means that entrepreneurship has not been as effective  
in producing and commercializing radical breakthrough 
innovations in recent times compared with earlier periods.  
The two main reasons for this phenomenon are (i) the 
‘defensive’ corporate strategies and approaches of the large 
corporations and the Mittelstand; and (ii) a growing gap 
between high- and low-productive firms, reflecting dis-
crepancies in management capabilities.
First, there is growing recognition that the essentially set-
tled 19th century industries are dominant and entrenched, 
and have the potential to ‘shift resources towards them-
selves’ (Fohlin, 2016, p. 19). The effect has been to put the 
focus on incremental innovations, resulting in a decline  
of the quality of technological breakthrough innovations.
Second, concerns have been rising that, more recently, 
a growing gap between leading and lagging firms has 
emerged in terms of innovation, with a resulting spread in 
company-level productivity. This occurs when the lagging 
firms cannot absorb the technology from leading firms and, 
moreover, when lagging firms start to find it increasingly 
hard to innovate or benefit from innovations (Andrews et 
al., 2016). One of the outcomes of this rising productivity 
gap is greater wage and income inequality (Bloom, 2017).
The increase in the proportion of lagging firms is also 
reflected in a declining number of firms investing in inno-
vation,25 in the declining start-up rate of new firms since 
1990,26 and in the small share of firms (only 1 percent)27 
aiming to grow (Henrekson and Sanandaji, 2017). 
24 Naudé (2016) argues that Europe is more generally in an ‘entrepre-
neurship crisis’, which is also echoed by Henrekson and Sanandaji 
(2017).
25 According to data from the Mannheim Enterprise Panel, the Gini  
coefficient for the proportion of firms with more than five employees 
that invest in innovation, increased from 0.88 in 1994 to 0.95 by 2013. 
This extreme level of inequality in terms of innovation implies that 
most firms in Germany invest nothing in innovation.
26 Data from the Mannheim Enterprise Panel show that the index of 
start-up activity (measuring the proportion of new firm entry) in 
Germany fell from 120 to 60 between 1990 and 2013, a 50 percent  
decline.
27 In comparison 3.6 percent of US firms indicate that they plan to grow, 
3.9 percent in China, and 5.7 percent in Switzerland (Henrekson and 
Sanandaji, 2017)
Figure 15 depicts the growing gap in productivity between 
leading and lagging firms since the 1990s. It shows that 
‘[b]etween 2001 and 2013, labor productivity at the global 
frontier increased at an average annual rate of 2.8 percent  
in the manufacturing sector, compared to productivity 
gains of just 0.6 percent for laggards’. 
The European Commission (2017) says existing evidence 
suggests that the impact of research and innovation (R&I) 
investment on productivity growth28 has been declining 
in general in Europe, and not just in Germany. It ascribes 
this as due to ‘obstacles to the diffusion of innovation from 
productivity-leading companies’ (ibid., p. 4). Hence, a lack 
of technology diffusion may be contributing to both the 
decline in productivity and the rise in income inequality. 
Inter-firm pay inequality might therefore present one rea-
son for growing income inequality in Germany. As Erixon 
and Weigel (2016, p. 235) put it, ‘a factor of rising inequality 
is that people work for the wrong firms’.
This lack of technology diffusion among firms, and the 
resulting polarization in labor productivity between leading 
and lagging firms, might be due to, among other factors, 
relatively poor management performance in German firms, 
especially in Mittelstand companies.29 Broszeit et al. (2016) 
find, using the German Management and Organizational 
Practices (GMOP) data set, that (i) German company- 
level productivity lags behind that of US firms; (ii) a rela-
tively wide productivity dispersal between firms exists; and 
(iii) a possible explanation for this finding lies in the poor 
management quality (on average) in German firms. Specif-
ically, a poorer management quality means that firms have 
less absorptive capacity to learn from firms at the techno-
logical frontier. The authors conclude that this shortcom-
ing is a particular problem for the Mittelstand, since ‘[g]iven 
the comparatively low level of management scores for these 
types of establishments, there is substantial potential for 
catching up’ (ibid., p. 28).
What may be the reasons for the comparative lack of man-
agement quality? According to Fohlin (2016, p. 21), this  
may reflect the lack of business school education in that 
‘the post-war German education system provided essen-
28 The European Commission (2017, p. 3) reports that a 10 percent in-
crease in R&I investment has been associated with an improvement 
in productivity of between 1.1 and 1.4 percent in the past, but that this 
relationship seems to be breaking down.
29 Cooper et al. (2017) suggest another (related) reason, namely that the 
greater labor market flexibility introduced by the Hartz reforms that 
has helped the country maintain high employment rates has done so 
at the price of declining firm productivity. The reason for this is that 
the specific practice of ‘short-time work’ has hindered the realloca-
tion of workers from less to more productive firms.
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tially no counterpart to the United States’ business school 
education’. It may also reflect a lack in both quality and 
quantity of entrepreneurship. 
Other potential reasons are the dominance of large firms  
in comparatively ‘old’ industries (e. g., machinery, automo-
biles, and energy) and the lack of venture capital (European  
Commission, 2017). Andrews et al. (2016) further identify  
a ‘decline in the contestability of markets’ as one of the 
reasons for the slower diffusion of technology. They rec-
ommend competition policy to address this shortcoming. 
Watzinger et al. (2017, p. 4) argue in their study that com-
petition policy is beneficial for innovation, citing the exam-
ple of Bell Labs (a U.S. research and scientific development 
company) and concluding that ‘antitrust enforcement can 
have an impact on the long-run rate of technological change 
[…] the anti-trust lawsuit led to a quicker diffusion of the 
transistor technology, one of the few general purpose tech-
nologies of the post-World War II period’. Finally, as Erixon 
and Weigel (2016, p. 27) note, fixed capital investment in the 
economy has declined ‘pretty dramatically’, and given that 
technology diffuses through the economy embodied in cap-
ital investment, this presents one reason for a slower pro-
cess. Figure 16 illustrates the precipitous decline in net fixed 
capital investment in Germany since 1991.
In conclusion, entrepreneurial stagnation in Germany is 
characterized by the defensive strategies of large incum-
bent firms and rather weak management practices. These 
result in a decline in fixed capital investments and a lower 
ability of lagging firms to learn from and catch up with 
leading firms. Inadequate competition allows lagging firms 
to survive, instead of pushing them out of the market, forc-
ing larger firms to make capital investments to compete 
with each other and/or newcomers. As a result, the diffu-
sion of technology has become sluggish, and with it labor 
productivity growth, too.
FIGURE 15: Widening labor productivity gap – frontier vs laggard manufacturing firms  
(value added per worker), 2001 to 2013
 Laggards   Frontier Firm (Top 5 %)
Notes: The global frontier is measured by the average of log labor productivity for the top 5 % of companies with the highest productivity levels within each 2-digit industry.  
Laggards capture the average log productivity of all the other firms. Unweighted averages across 2-digit industries are shown for manufacturing firms, normalized to 0 in the starting 
year. The time period is 2001 to 2013. The vertical axis represents log-differences from the starting year: the frontier in manufacturing has a value of about 0.3 in the final year,  
which corresponds to approximately 30 % higher productivity in 2013 compared to 2001. See details in Section 3.3 of Andrews et al. (2016).
Source: Andrews et al. (2016) based on the recent update of the OECD-Orbis productivity database (Gal, 2013).  
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6  Declining technological innovativeness  
and rising income inequality
From the previous sections it can be concluded that the 
decline in technological innovativeness has caused labor 
productivity growth to stagnate: a potential reason for the 
rise in income inequality. The link, however, is neither  
direct nor automatic. In this section we argue that slow 
productivity growth combined with demographic change 
has caused policymakers and the corporate sector to reduce 
real labor compensation, and thus erode the social welfare 
state. It is further noted that, unlike in the United States, 
income inequality in Germany has not been caused by glo-
balization or financialization of the economy. 
6.1  Demographic changes, demand  
stagnation and labor markets
Germany is characterized by low fertility rates and an aging 
population.30 The average age of the German population 
increased from 38.3 in 1991 to 41.8 in 2009 (Fritsch et al., 
2015), with more than 31 percent of households receiving 
pensions (Drosdowski et al., 2015). This demographic shift 
has and will have both direct and indirect effects on income 
inequality.
As a direct effect, aging can lead to more income inequal-
ity, because there are more pensioners (who have, on aver-
age, lower incomes)31 and a reduced workforce (with higher 
wages due to scarcity). Whether this occurs, and how far 
it impacts, remain questionable and can only be settled 
empirically. 
30 This is generally the case for Western Europe. As the European  
Commission (2013) notes, by 2030 the EU-27 population will amount 
to approximately 522 million, of which 23 percent will be older than 
65. UN-DESA (2015) estimates that 217 million people in Europe will 
be older than 60 by 2030. In Germany, an old and stagnating popu-
lation means that the labor force will begin to shrink by 2025 to the 
extent that, all things being equal, there will be between 3 to 6 mil-
lion fewer labor market participants in 2050 compared to 2012 (Faik, 
2012).
31 Households on pension receive on average 18 percent less than the 
average household (Drosdowski et al., 2015).
According to Drosdowski et al. (2015), ‘most empirical 
findings so far show that income inequality increases with 
demographic aging’. Klemm and Weigert (2014) ascribe ten 
percent of the rise in income inequality since the 1990s to 
aging. Drosdowski et al. (2015) study these questions using 
a macro-econometric input-output model that predicts 
more income inequality in Germany as the population ages, 
with it accelerating after 2025 due to labor shortages. Faik 
(2012) similarly finds that demographic factors have been 
a significant determinant of income inequality, and that, 
moreover, the current trend in aging predicts ‘a remarkable 
increase of German inequality by 2060’ (ibid., p. 1).
Households having children later in life and less stable 
marriages have accompanied this demographic trend;  
furthermore, a significant increase in the number of single- 
parent households can be observed. According to the Euro-
pean Commission (2013), these changes in household 
structure explain 13 percent of income inequality in a coun-
try such as Sweden. In the case of Germany, Biewen and 
Juhasz (2012, p. 629) find that the decline in household size 
and the increase in single parent households have had a 
‘moderate’ impact on income inequality.
Evidence further shows that ‘assortative mating’ is having  
an effect in Germany. This term refers to the phenomenon 
where couples with relatively similar educational and skills 
levels marry. It has been theoretically modeled and found 
empirically to drive higher income inequality over time 
(Fernández and Rogerson, 2001; Greenwood et al., 2014). 
Greenwood et al. (2014) find, using US Census Bureau data 
from 1960 to 2005, that ‘assortative mating’ has increased 
significantly and is, moreover, a significant driver of 
income inequality, as predicted by models such as Fernán-
dez and Rogerson (2001). They find that in the United 
States the Gini coefficient would amount to 0.34 instead  
of 0.43, if marriages were based on random matching  
instead of ‘assortative matching’ by 2005. Grave and 
Schmidt (2012) show, using German Microcensus data  
from 1976 to 2005, that ‘assortative mating’ has also  
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therefore argue for selective immigration policies towards 
attracting highly skilled workers, coupled with flexible  
labor market arrangements. They find evidence from French 
data, between 1990 and 2010, that such a policy could 
reduce the relative wages of the highly skilled – i. e., reduce 
the skills premium, and hence lower income inequality.
Finally, if spending decreases with age and the elderly save 
more than the remainder of society, demographic changes 
can also contribute to rising income inequality. In this case, 
the government and corporate sector’s response can be 
to seek reductions in real labor compensation to maintain 
export competitiveness.
6.2 Erosion of the social welfare state
The erosion of the social welfare state can be traced back  
at least to the period following the oil crisis of the 1970s. 
Seeleib-Kaiser (2001) discusses the SPD’s Ökonomisch- 
politischer Orienterungsrahmen für die Jahre 1975 bis 1985  
(economic-political orientation framework for the years 
1975 to 1985), which set out the claim that the social wel-
fare state, established after the Second World War and 
underpinning the Wirtschaftswunder, was now threaten-
ing the international competitiveness of German firms. 
The unification process of the 1990s delayed many pro-
posed policies for cutting back on the welfare state (ibid.). 
significantly increased income inequality in Germany over 
the past three decades, contributing to wage polarization.  
Huber and Winkler (2016, p. 3) find similar evidence, using 
data from the GSOEP covering the period 1993 to 2008. 
Their results show that 70 percent of German workers 
‘have the same educational level and 15 percent work in  
the same 2-digit industry as their partner’.
The demographic determinants of income inequality in 
Germany have been pertinent to the country’s debate on 
immigration. Most scholars concur that the recent influx 
may only have a short- to medium-term impact on meet-
ing the requirements for skilled labor in the German econ-
omy (Drosdowski et al., 2015). It may, however, also lead to 
higher income inequality. The European Commission (2013) 
observes that migrants to Europe infrequently bring the 
required skills and are not always effectively integrated into 
labor markets. Hence, they are ‘over-represented in low-
skilled occupations and self-employment’.
Blau and Kahn (2012) point out that migrants may increase 
the supply of low-skilled labor, thereby reducing wages for 
all low-skilled workers, so that wage inequality rises. Card 
(2009) argues that migrants tend to be concentrated in the 
‘tails of the skill distribution’, i. e., they tend to be either 
low-skilled workers or highly skilled, so that an increase  
in a country’s immigrant population may be accompanied  
by an increase in income inequality. Edo and Toubal (2015) 
FIGURE 16: Net fixed capital formation (in 2010 prices), 1991 to 2016, in billion EUR
Notes: Net fixed capital investment in billions of EUR.
Source: European Commission AMECO database online. 
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FIGURE 18: Union density and in-work at-risk-of-poverty rate, 2005 to 2014, in percent
FIGURE 17: Union density and top 1 percent income, 1960 to 2011
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Between 2002 to 2005 then, a series of fundamental 
reforms were implemented, the so-called Hartz IV reforms 
(Felbermayr et al., 2014). These included various labor 
market reforms and further contributed to the decentrali-
zation of collective bargaining power from the late 1990s. 
As a consequence of these reforms, ‘wage flexibility has 
increased sharply in Germany due to the documented 
decline of collective bargaining agreements’ (ibid., p. 37).  
As The Economist (2017) points out, because workers in 
Germany value employment security to a large extent, they 
are willing to accept lower wage growth in return.
The decline in collective bargaining that followed the 
Hartz IV reforms is reflected in the decline in union den-
sity. Figure 17 shows that union density has significantly 
declined since its peak in the late 1970s, and moreover that 
it has been accompanied by a significant rise in income 
inequality, as measured by the share of income earned by 
the top 1 percent.
Falling union density is also inversely related to the 
‘in-work-at-risk-of-poverty rate’, as Figure 18 shows. 
This suggests that one reason for the increase in income 
inequality may be found in the increased income share 
of the top 1 percent, and the simultaneous increase in 
the prevalence of the working poor, as low-skilled work-
ers accept pay-cuts. In fact, the rate of working and being 
poor almost doubled from 4.8 to 9.6 percent in Germany 
between 2005 and 2015 (OECD, 2016).
Between 1996 and 2010 the share of workers covered 
by industry-level wage agreements declined from 77 to 
53 percent, and of those covered by any form of collective  
agreement from 82 to 62 percent (Felbermayr et al., 2014). 
According to Baumgarten (2013, p. 5) this decentralization  
of wage bargaining has been one reason for the rise in wage 
inequality, because it primarily lowered the relative wages 
of ‘workers in the lower part of the earnings distribution’. 
Felbermayr et al. (2014) point out that particularly wages  
in the 20th percentile have declined significantly, driving  
a wider skills premium. Using data for the period 1996 
to 2010, the authors decompose wage inequality and find 
that 50 percent of the increase in wage inequality can be 
explained by the decline in collective wage bargaining. 
Figure 19 furthermore shows that since around 2000 the 
growth in profit rates has substantially exceeded that in 
labor compensation, meaning that the functional distribu-
FIGURE 19: Growth in gross profits and labor compensation, 1991 to 2015, in percent
 Growth in gross profits  Growth in labor compensation
Source: European Commission AMECO database online. 
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tion of income will, ceteris paribus, worsen. It also shows the 
dramatic impact of the global financial crisis on profits, and 
their very rapid recovery afterwards. 
In addition to the Hartz reforms that reduced social secu- 
rity benefits, a cut in the top marginal tax rate from 53 per-
cent in 1999 to 42 percent in 2007, was introduced (Biewen  
and Juhasz, 2012). The Hartz reforms were followed by an 
increase in self-employment, rising from 8 percent in 1991 
to 11 percent of the labor force in 2009. The proportion of 
the self-employed in the service sector increased from 36 
in 1991 to 53 percent in 2009. This was an important mech-
anism for reducing unemployment and for accelerating the 
structural shift in the German labor market, away from 
manufacturing towards more (skill-intensive) services 
(Fritsch et al., 2015).
More self-employment in a country is generally associated  
with higher income inequality. This is because the distribu- 
tion of earnings among the self-employed tends to be quite  
diverse, with a few high-income and many low-income 
earners (OECD, 2011). Frick and Grabka (2009) indeed find  
that the self-employed in Germany are on average wealthier 
than wage-earners, with the average wealth of a self-em-
ployed person with more than ten employees amounting 
to approximately EUR 1.1 million in 2009 – a sum approxi-
mately ten times higher than the average wealth of a wage 
earner.
6.3 Inequality is different in Germany than  
in the United States
Finally, before summarizing and putting forward some  
policy recommendations for inclusive growth in Germany, 
it can be pointed out that the patterns and determinants 
of income inequality are different in Germany with respect 
to the United States. The issue of rising inequality is very 
topical in the United States, and has been the subject of a 
growing literature, wherein the globalization and financial-
ization of the US economy have been two of its major driv-
ers. It can be asked whether or not these determinants may 
also be relevant for Germany. This sub-section shows that 
this is not the case. This has two implications: first, caution 
is advised in terms of avoiding financialization in Germany 
in the future and second, the predictions about and analysis 
of the replacement of human jobs by robots, such as by 
Acemoglu and Restrepo (2017), are based on US data and 
experience, and therefore perhaps not as relevant for Ger-
many. Indeed a recent German study shows no evidence 
that robots are causing total job losses in the country 
(Dauth et al., 2017b).
Since the mid-1970s the United States has experienced  
significant increases in income inequality, but also in 
unemployment and job polarization, especially in the  
manufacturing sector. Today, the US manufacturing  
sector contributes only around 12 percent to employment, 
compared to roughly 23 percent in Germany. The reasons 
for this de-industrialization and the accompanying rise in 
wage inequality are largely due to globalization and finan-
cialization. The impact of globalization occurred through 
the offshoring of manufacturing, which ‘exported’ jobs to 
China and other Asian countries (Baily and Bosworth, 2014). 
The financialization of the economy occurred as a result 
of deregulation, which drew away the ‘best and brightest’ 
from production into financial services, where relative  
wages started to outpace those in other industries from the 
late 1970s (Philippon and Reshef, 2012), contributing to the 
demise of labor unions and collective bargaining, and the 
rise of the shareholder economy (Lazonick, 2013; Lazonick  
and Mazzucato, 2013). Lazonick (2013) describes the term 
‘financialization’ as the making of economic decisions 
that are not based upon production considerations, but 
(financial) share price information. In the United States 
resources have been massively diverted from physical pro-
duction (manufacturing) towards the financial sector. This 
has generated higher income inequality by shifting income 
increasingly from labor to capital sources.
Are globalization and financialization equally responsible 
for higher inequality in Germany? This study argues that 
this is not the case. On the contrary, globalization has  
had a positive influence on jobs and equality. As docu-
mented by Dauth et al. (2017a), employment in manufac-
turing declined much less in export-oriented industries 
– in fact, employment has remained remarkably constant 
since the 1990s in these industries. Germany manages  
a large trade surplus32 on its current account, in contrast  
to the United States, which manages a large trade deficit.  
During the 1990s, furthermore, large German firms inter-
nationalized successfully by moving parts of their value 
chain to Eastern and Central European countries, thereby 
remaining globally competitive (Veugelers, 2013; Marin, 
2016). Dauth et al. (2017a) also find that the expansion of 
service sector employment in Germany did not primarily 
occur because of workers re-allocating out of manufactur-
ing, but rather because of jobs being created for new labor 
32 Germany, in fact, has the largest trade surplus of any country,  
reaching a record of USD 300 billion in 2016 (Dubner, 2017).
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market entrants and the former unemployed. They con-
clude that (ibid., p. 3), ‘[u]nlike in the case of the US, glo-
balization therefore did not speed up the manufacturing 
decline in Germany, but it even retained those jobs in the 
economy.’
Financialization is also not a major contributor to income 
inequality in Germany. At present, its scale is not as exten-
sive as in the United States and the United Kingdom. Since 
2001 there has been a corporate de-leveraging in Ger-
many following the abolition of government guarantees 
for Landesbanken,33 and a further de-leveraging after the 
2008 financial crisis (Veugelers, 2013). The share of profits 
and property incomes in the gross national income (GNI) 
has remained stable, between 22 to 24 percent and only six 
percent of the top one percent’s income is derived from the 
financial sector (Niehues, 2015). Other authors point to the 
rather limited rise in the CEO compensation in Germany, 
due to the unique Mittelstand, where supervisory boards 
play an important part in corporate governance. The finan-
cialization of an economy often goes hand in hand with a 
33 The Landesbanken are a group of state-owned banks of a type unique 
to Germany. They are regionally organized and their business is pre-
dominantly wholesale banking.
property boom, which can be also ruled out in the case of 
Germany. As Figure 20 shows, real house prices have even 
been declining during certain periods.
Although the financialization of the economy has not been 
a cause of rising income inequality in Germany so far, it 
may become more pronounced as a future source. Caution  
is necessary, since there are indeed signs that financial 
capital sources of income are becoming more important 
(Dell, 2005; Frick and Grabka, 2009; OECD, 2011).
FIGURE 20: Real house price index, 1870 to 2011, 1990 = 100
Note: Shaded areas indicate periods of World Wars. 
Source: Figure and data taken from Knoll et al. (2017). 
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7 Summary, recommendations  
and concluding remarks
Inequality started out at low levels after the Second World 
War,34 and even declined in the early subsequent decades, 
but began to rise again, particularly during the 1990s. At 
the same time, Germany lagged behind the United States, 
Japan, and South Korea in terms of radical innovations in 
key new industries such as semiconductors, nanotechnol-
ogy and robotics. This was moreover a period during which 
the social welfare state began to erode, partly as a response 
to reduced impact of technological innovation on labor 
productivity growth. The outcome was rising income and 
wealth inequalities.
This study therefore argues that it is not ‘too much’ tech-
nological innovation that is causing rising income inequal-
ity in Germany, through skill-biased technological change, 
but the opposite – a declining impact of technological 
innovation on labor productivity growth. Fearing that this 
declining impact would undermine the economy’s interna-
tional competitiveness, real labor compensation was pro-
gressively curbed from the mid-1990s. This occurred inter 
alia through the government’s erosion of the social wel-
fare state, as well as offshoring and reduced fixed capital 
investment by the corporate sector. The outcome was ris-
ing income and wealth inequalities. Between the mid-1990s 
and 2010 the rise in wage inequality was faster in Germany 
than in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Can-
ada. This study identified three reasons why technological 
innovation has become less and less effective: (i) historical 
legacies, (ii) weaknesses in the education system, and (iii) 
entrepreneurial stagnation.
7.2 Recommendations
First, a focus should be set on revamping the German tech-
nological innovation system, although this might be diffi-
34 The two World Wars of the 20th century have had a leveling effect on 
economic equality by destroying wealth, infrastructure, and social and 
political structures (Piketty, 2013).
7.1 Summary
Technological innovation has been central to Germany’s 
economic success. During the period 1850 to 1913 the coun-
try’s economic rise, from an industrial ‘backwater’ to an 
industrial powerhouse, was made possible by a remarkable 
and historically unparalleled series of radical innovations. 
These included technologies such as the internal combus-
tion engine, aspirin, radar, the diesel engine, and others. 
The provision of supporting social welfare, first introduced 
during this period, including unemployment and pension 
insurance, health and employment protection, helped to 
ensure that the growth sparked by these innovations was to 
a large degree socially inclusive: income inequality did not 
increase and indicators of human development improved 
consistently. The technological breakthrough innovations  
of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, led, moreover, 
to the rise of a number of firms that would become global 
household names. Firms such as Siemens, Bosch, Thyssen-
Krupp, Bayer, and BASF were among those founded dur-
ing this period. These firms and others would later provide 
a basis for the Mittelstand-led Wirtschaftswunder of the 1950s 
and 1960s.
The Wirtschaftswunder, however, could not be sustained. 
Average annual per capita growth started to decline in  
the 1970s. In the post-war era, Germany’s industries  
were largely focused on incremental rather than on radi- 
cal innovations. In fact, the country lost its leading edge  
as a generator of radical innovations during the ‘third 
industrial revolution’, and was overtaken as a leading  
innovation country by the United States, and later by 
Japan and South Korea. The manner in which the country 
responded to the potential loss of its international com- 
petitiveness had significant implications for income and 
wealth inequalities. 
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A second recommendation is to focus on the social welfare 
system as the most important tool for inclusive economic 
growth in the short-run. Social protection, fiscal redistri-
bution, and active labor market policies (ALMP)37 will pro-
vide the most appropriate measures to stop income and 
wealth inequalities from further widening in the upcoming  
years. These could include the creation of more government 
jobs, more redistributive taxation,38 and a stronger collec- 
tive labor and union movement. Fears that stronger union-
ization will be detrimental to innovation in Germany’s 
case are, so far, unfounded. On the contrary, Addison et 
al. (2013, p. 6) do not find any proof that unionization has 
delayed innovation in the past and even find some evidence  
that unionization benefited innovation. This positive impact 
of unionization on innovation may be due to the participa-
tion of workers in managing the ‘adoption and spread of 
new technologies’.
It can further be suggested to consider new and innovative 
forms of social protection schemes. These could include,  
for example, a form of Universal Basic Income (UBI)39 or  
a negative income tax, although there are many justifiable  
objections to such schemes. The many objections, rein-
forced by the practical difficulties, make them unlikely 
to be implemented in the near future. A global wealth tax 
could further support redistribution and thereby lower ine-
qualities, and may, moreover, be used to finance innovative 
social protection schemes. A global wealth tax, however,  
is equally unlikely to be implemented. The search for other 
policy measures will certainly continue, as for example in  
a recent proposal by the European Union and Bill Gates that 
37 These policies amount to about 1 percent of GDP at present, compared 
to 2 percent in Denmark, where they have been found to be effective.  
Zollner et al. (2016) evaluate a range of entrepreneurship promotion  
programs (including bridging allowances and start-up subsidies) 
within Germany’s ALMP and find that they had ‘high success rates 
as well as high cost efficiency’. This recommendation resonates with 
the evaluation of the German social welfare system by Snower et al. 
(2009, p. 155) who identify as a crucial problem ‘a lack of adaptability  
and versatility [of the labor force] in the presence of the reorganiza-
tion of production and work in response to technology-driven glo-
balization processes’ which requires state support to allow these  
laborers to ‘turn themselves into winners through their own efforts’.
38 The concern is whether higher tax rates would discourage entre- 
preneurs (who are typically among the highest income earners),  
which, in turn, could lead to less job creation. A welfare-maximiz- 
ing top tax rate should thus balance the potential reduction in job  
creation with the increased ability to provide transfer payments. 
Brüggemann (2016) provides model estimates, using US data, which 
shows that a welfare-maximizing top marginal tax rate would be  
82.5 percent.
39 A UBI is a payment to every adult citizen, irrespective of labor  
market status or income. A number of UBI schemes (or Bedingungs- 
loses Grundeinkommen) have also been proposed for Germany  
(Haywood, 2014).
cult to implement: the recent historical evidence suggests 
that it has become rather entrenched. It may be difficult 
for the government and industry to significantly alter the 
nature of the country’s innovation system over the short- 
to medium-term. Innovation policies, for instance poli-
cies to spur R&D and commercialize intellectual property in 
important new industries, are not expected to lead to quick 
results. This does not mean, however, that there is nothing 
the government can do to invigorate the innovation sys-
tem into delivering more breakthrough innovations, par-
ticularly in the areas underpinning Industrie 4.0. This study 
can recommend, following Mazzucato (2015), that a ‘mis-
sion-driven’ industrial policy, aiming to ‘stimulate devel-
opment of markets and activities for those things which at 
present are not done at all’ could be useful in this regard. 
Many of the current de facto ‘industrial-policy’ initiatives, 
such the Energiewende (energy transition)35 are focused on 
incumbents instead of focusing on ‘things that are not done 
at all’ or in which the country is lagging.36
Moreover, such a shift in industrial policy will also require 
a change in the approach of public sector organizations 
towards innovation policy. One important point to bear in 
mind is that, as Coad and Rao (2008) pointed out, ‘an inno-
vation strategy is even more uncertain than playing a lot-
tery, because it is a game of chance in which neither the 
probability nor the prize can be known for sure in advance’. 
Hence, the public sector must be prepared to occasionally  
fail, and to act entrepreneurially. For Mazzucato (2015, p. 125)  
this raises the question, ‘[h]ow should public organizations 
be structured so that they can accommodate the risk-taking 
and explorative capacity needed’? Answering this question 
falls outside the scope of the present study, although an 
answer will be increasingly required if sustained and inclu-
sive growth is to resume in Germany in future.
35 In ‘Industrieland Deutschland’ (Germany as an industrial nation) the 
major industries such as automobiles, machines, chemicals and  
electro-technology are all energy-intensive. The cost of energy is an 
important determinant of their competitiveness. The current  
approach to energy is contained in the Energiewende of 2010, which 
aims to steer the country to certain targets of energy consumption,  
greenhouse gas emissions, and the use of renewable energy by 2050.  
Policy support for renewable energies started in 1991 with the Strom- 
einspeisungsgesetz (Law on the Sale of Electricity to the Grid); in 2000 
the Erneubare Energien Gesetz (Renewable Energies Act) was intro-
duced, and more recently the decision was taken to phase out the  
use of nuclear energy by 2022 (Rutten, 2014).
36 In recent years there have been increasing calls for so-called ‘in-
clusive innovation policies’ (e. g., Planes-Satorra and Paunov, 2017, 
p. 17), referring to policies that ‘aim to remove barriers to the par-
ticipation of individuals, social groups, firms, sectors and regions 
that are under-represented in innovation activities’. More research 
is needed to clarify whether and how such inclusive innovation could 
also lead to more effective innovation, i. e., innovation that raises 
labor productivity in Germany.
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robots should be taxed.40 Such social protection measures 
may also help stimulate innovation in Germany, as a more 
equal distribution of economic growth will boost domestic  
demand.
It is widely accepted that social protection and fiscal redis-
tribution should be reformed – not only because of the 
challenges of potential technology-induced unemployment 
(whether real or not), but also because of demographic 
changes and the resulting pressure on public finances.
Third, a reform of the education system remains funda-
mentally necessary, not only to deliver the scientists and 
entrepreneurs that can spearhead future innovation-led 
growth, but to allow skills to be more transferable and less 
specialized than at present. As the labor intensity of Ger-
many’s manufacturing sector continues to decline, it will 
become more necessary for the workforce to be better 
adapted (with diversified skills) to reallocate to the service 
sector. Herein lifelong learning,41 as well as managerial and 
entrepreneurial competences, are essential components. 
40 A difficulty, however, lies in the definition of a ‘robot’. For this and 
other reasons the EU recently rejected a proposal to consider a tax on 
robots. Guerreiro et al. (2017) show that if the cost of automation falls 
to the extent that full automation occurs, it is in fact not optimal to 
tax robots.
41 Gries et al. (2017) present a theoretical model of population aging and 
skill-biased technological change to show that ‘well-designed educa-
tion policies can substitute for simple social transfers’, and that this 
is especially the case for lifelong learning which helps aging workers 
to find and keep employment.
A possible reason for the lack of relative managerial com-
petences in Germany may be the dominance of the econ-
omy by a number of large incumbent firms, most of them 
with historic roots in the pre-war area and the lack of con-
testability in markets. Thus, as a complementary policy, 
increasing competition in the economy, and stimulating 
fixed capital investment by these large incumbent firms  
is a further recommendation.
Finally, it is also essential to align immigration policies 
with the country’s growing shortage of educated workers. 
Attracting appropriately skilled immigrants, better inte-
grating the existing stock of immigrants,42 integrating 
working parents in the economy, and postponing retire-
ment through more flexible work practices, are further  
policies that can be recommended.
An overview of the policy recommendations outlined in  
this section, including a set of examples, is summarized  
in Table 3. 
42 After the United States, Germany has become the most significant  
international destination for migrants. According to Daley and Kulish 
(2013, p. A1), however, ‘Germany’s experience with integrating foreign 
workers in the past […] has proved difficult […]. A recent study found 
that more than half of the Greeks and Spaniards who came to Ger-
many left within a year’. The Bertelsmann Stiftung (2014, p. 31) notes 
‘a worrisome trend with regard to acceptance of diversity’. Their in-
dicator of ‘acceptance of diversity’ has declined consistently in Ger-
many since the mid-1990s. The report recognizes that more needs to 
be done with integration, stating that ‘[i]ntegration is needed – not 
only of immigrants, but of anyone who is different’.
TABLE 3: Overview policy recommendations and examples for Germany
Policy recommendation Examples
Stimulate the industrial-innovation system  
to raise productivity growth
• Promote R&D in new and lagging sectors.
• Expand active labor market policies.
• Improve contestability of markets.
• Implement industrial policies and venture capital funding for raising real investment.
• Improve labor market mobility.
Strengthen the social welfare system • Develop innovative social protection schemes.
• Ensure a progressive tax-transfer system.
• Strengthen the power of unions.
Diversify the education system • Promote diversification of skills.
• Enhance lifelong learning.
• Expand managerial and entrepreneurial competencies.
Align immigration policies, integrate working 
parents, postpone retirement
• Attract appropriately skilled immigrants.
• Better integrate the existing stock of immigrants.
• Promote technologies that will help postpone retirement.
Source: Authors’ own creation. 
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7.3  Concluding comments: What if the ‘fourth 
industrial revolution’ is different?
Technological innovation has historically contributed to 
inclusive economic growth in Germany. But will this also 
be the case in the near future, given that many are claim-
ing that the technologies which characterize Industrie 4.0 
are different? The fear is that they will replace human labor 
instead of complementing it, unlike previous technolo-
gies (Ford, 2015). Germany may be particularly vulnerable 
for two reasons: first, about 23 percent of its labor force is 
employed in industry, which presents the sector that will be 
most affected by the ‘fourth industrial revolution’; and sec-
ond, since the Second World War the United States and other 
countries have overtaken Germany in terms of producing 
the radical (product) innovations that are driving the new 
industrial revolutions. If disruptive technologies, in which 
Germany lacks any leading innovative position, replace 
many of these jobs over the next two decades, it could well 
result in further increasing income and wealth inequalities.
The vulnerability of Germany is compounded by the fact 
that the reallocation of the workforce from manufacturing 
to other sectors, such as services, may be difficult because 
of the more limited transferability of skills in the econ-
omy. The German education system is excellent in forming 
skilled workers for specialized areas based on its economic  
structure. Whereas this has been a recipe for past successes, 
it may become a liability in the future. Unlike the United 
States and the United Kingdom, Germany has a less diver-
sified education system with proportionally more tertiary 
education students in engineering and science than in ser-
vices, social sciences, and other sectors. The German system 
has also become slow to adapt, is perceived as bureaucratic, 
and lacks entrepreneurial dynamics. Hence, it may have 
difficulties in providing for the ‘re-skilling’ of the labor 
force and in attracting the necessary high-skilled workers. 
The outcome may well be that the skills premium in the 
labor market will continue to rise, as certain skills become 
scarcer, also as more and more people exit the labor market 
on reaching retirement age. Thus, income inequality may 
also rise in future via this channel.
These concerns need not become reality. There are two rea-
sons to be optimistic: first, there is no consensus that the 
‘fourth industrial revolution’ will indeed lead to the huge 
job replacement and unemployment rates that some pre-
dict, and that have made headlines. Many leading scien-
tists suggest that the impacts will not be as radical and that 
tasks rather than jobs will be affected; and moreover, that 
new markets and new business models will result in many 
new jobs being created (see e. g., Autor, 2015; Pfeiffer, 2016). 
As Autor (2015, p. 26) concludes, the distinction between 
tasks and jobs is important; although automation will affect 
tasks, it may not affect jobs to the same extent, and even 
raise the demand for jobs that contain different combina-
tions of tasks including problem-solving skills: ‘[w]hile 
some of the tasks in many middle-skill jobs are suscepti-
ble to automation, many middle-skill jobs will continue to 
demand a mixture of tasks from across the skills spectrum’. 
For Germany, unlike several other countries, the rise of 
the ‘fourth industrial revolution’ in newly emerging coun-
tries potentially offers many opportunities as a supplier of 
inputs, materials, services, and technologies. It may even 
result in less need or incentives for German companies to 
outsource or offshore their manufacturing or assembling to 
countries with low-cost labor. The potential of the ‘fourth 
industrial revolution’ may well be that Germany in particu-
lar, and Europe more broadly, will experience a ‘re-shor-
ing’ of manufacturing. This, in turn, could lead to fewer 
jobs being exported, and hence result in more inclusive 
economic growth.
Second, German policy makers, industry associations and 
academics are well aware of the potential threats and 
opportunities, and a number of prominent policy initia-
tives in recent years are explicit and well-crafted attempts 
to ensure that manufacturing remains competitive, con-
tinues to provide jobs, and improves its innovativeness. 
Among these are active labor market policies, which con-
sist, for example, of policies to encourage entrepreneur-
ship. A recent evaluation of these measures finds them to 
be successful overall (Zollner et al., 2016). The long-term 
competitiveness of Germany’s manufacturing sector will 
depend more than ever on the extent to which the required 
skills (termed ‘21st century skills’) will be available in the 
economy. The effectiveness of higher education and its col-
laboration with business and government in the ‘triple-he-
lix’ model will become more important, both for the incre-
mental innovations that are needed to absorb and utilize 
the new technologies originating elsewhere, as for the more 
radical innovations that will be required to assume a lead-
ing global role as producer. Germany fortunately has much 
experience with the ‘triple-helix model’ which served it 
well during its industrialization phase in the 19th century. 
It can serve it well again, for its (re)industrialization in the 
21st century.
In conclusion, this study stresses the need for further 
research, focusing on future opportunities and on assessing 
the impact of new technologies rigorously, as well as on the 
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elaboration of new policy instruments to steer innova- 
tion, such as the EU’s new directives on pre-commercial 
innovation procurement and innovation partnerships.43
The argument that the ‘fourth industrial revolution’ may  
be significantly different from previous ones, with less 
scope for compensatory employment creation, should – 
despite the optimism – still be taken seriously; just as the 
social, political and ethical implications of artificial intelli-
gence have to be given more attention by policy makers and 
scientists. Germany cannot afford to be complacent about 
any trend that affects employment in its manufacturing 
sector. The remote but real threat is that, given Germany’s 
lagging position in radical new ICT innovation, its manu-
facturing industry will ultimately become ‘a sub-sector of 
the IT sector in the US’ (Malmer and Tholen, 2015, p. 53).44
43 See, for instance, the ‘EU policy initiatives on Innovation Procure-
ment’.
44 The United States’ Smart Manufacturing Leadership Coalition (SMLC) 
aims, with strong US government financial backing, to (re)capture the 
United States’ global dominance in manufacturing.
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Appendix
TABLE 4: The top 20 hidden champions in Germany, 2015
Company Sector (product) Turnover in mio EUR (latest) Employment (latest)
Herrenknecht Machinery (tunneling) 1,300 4,955
Otto Bock Health care (mobility) 1,000 7,614
Lürssen Shipbuilding 829 1,635
Delo Chemicals 80 500
Windmöller & Holscher Machinery (flexible packaging) 500 2,000
Grimme Agricultural machinery 438 2,200
Haver & Boecker Machinery 470 2,870
Duravit Ceramics 380 5,700
Kaeser Kompressoren Machine tools 650 5,000
Peri Construction tools 873 5,300
Schunk Machine tools 360 2,700
Dorma Construction materials 856 6,500
Sick Industrial sensors 1,000 6,597
Mennekes Industrial plugs 100 800
Abeking & Rasmussen Shipbuilding na 393
KWS Saat Biotechnology 1,003 4,843
Renolit Chemicals 410 4,500
Sennheiser Audio equipment 385 2,100
Max Weishaupt Energy 540 3,000
Big Dutchman Agricultural machinery 905 2,853
Total 7,780 72,060
Source: Authors’ own compilation.
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